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This paper investigates the extent to which strategic objectives of the U.S. government influenced
news coverage during the Cold War. We establish two relationships: 1) strategic objectives of the
U.S. government cause the State Department to under-report human rights violations of strategic allies;
and 2) these objectives reduce news coverage of human rights abuses for strategic allies in six U.S.
national newspapers. To establish causality, we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in a country's
strategic value to the U.S. from the interaction of its political alliance to the U.S. and membership
on the United Nations Security Council. In addition to the main results, we are able to provide qualitative











david.yanagizawa@gmail.com“The need for high-quality reporting is greater than ever. It’s not just the journal-
ist’s job at risk here. It’s American democracy.” – Walter Cronkite in a speech at
Columbia University, January, 2007.
1 Introduction
Governments can inﬂuence the information reported by media outlets that it own (Enikolopov,
Petrova and Zhuravskaya, 2009; Durante and Knight, 2009).1 Its ability to do so with inde-
pendently owned outlets operating in a competitive market is less obvious. In theory, market
competition and independent ownership should act as safeguards against government manip-
ulation of the media (Besley and Prat, 2006).2 According to this, the U.S. media should be
safer from government inﬂuence than most other media markets in the world (Djankov, et al.,
2000).3 In practice, although studies such as Prat and Stromberg (2005) suggest that compe-
tition in the U.S. increases the likelihood that news organizations will report the truth, the
extent to which the U.S. media is free from government inﬂuence is an open empirical ques-
tion.4 This is somewhat surprising given the many historical controversies over the media,
the “watchdog” of American democracy, being manipulated by the government (e.g. Iran-
contra during mid 1980s; and more recently, in 2003, preceding the U.S. invasion of Iraq) and
the growing number of studies ﬁnding that the media has real political, economic and social
consequences.5
1For example, Durante and Knight (2009) ﬁnds that television stations owned by Italian president Silvio
Berlusconi shifted the content of their reports towards the agenda of his party when his party came to
power. Similarly, the ﬁnding by Enikolopov, Petrova and Zhuravskaya (2009) that viewers with access to more
independent stations in Russia are more likely to vote against the government party implies that government
owned stations promote the government’s agenda.
2Also, see Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008b), which provides a detailed discussion of the role of market forces
in news coverage by the commercial press.
3The U.S. Media has one of the most competitive markets in the world, and the government has no stake in
the ownership of any of the major media outlets. The government provides funding to the Voice of America,
which only broadcasts overseas, and National Public Radio.
4In addition, see discussion in Gentzkow, Glaeser and Goldin (2006).
5Blanton (2001) provides an overview of all the actions taken by the OPD during the Reagan Administration
(1980-88). Critics such as Noam Chomsky have gone as far as comparing the relationship between the U.S.
media and the government to that of the former U.S.S.R. with its oﬃcial government newspaper, Pravda
(Herman and Chomsky, 2002: p. 139) . For detailed accounts of when the media allows the government to
2This study attempts to ﬁll this gap by measuring the extent to which the U.S. government
can systematically inﬂuence news coverage of the commercial press. In particular, we aim to
estimate the eﬀect of strategic objectives on State Department reports of human rights abuses
in foreign countries and the eﬀect of these objectives on news coverage in six independently
owned national U.S. newspapers during the latter part of the Cold War, 1976-88.6 The former
reveals the extent to which oﬃcial government publications respond to strategic objectives and
provides evidence for the hypothesis that strategic objectives cause the U.S. government to
attempt to bias reports of human rights practices for foreign countries. The latter investigates
the extent to which strategic objectives can also aﬀect commercial news coverage. Together,
these two relationships address the question of how much inﬂuence the U.S. government has
on news coverage by independently owned media ﬁrms.
We face several empirical diﬃculties. First, strategic objectives are unobservable and it
is diﬃcult to measure the government’s eﬀort in attempting to manipulate information. The
second problem is reverse causality. Are strategic objectives driving government and commer-
cial news reports of human rights abuses? Or are they responding to the latter (Stromberg,
2004)?7 Finally, there is the problem of omitted variable bias. This is particularly problematic
in estimating the eﬀect of strategic objectives on news reports because both may be outcomes
of a third factor, such as public opinion. For example, in the months before the U.S.-led 2003
invasion of Iraq, both the U.S. government’s strategic desire to invade Iraq and news coverage
of human rights abuses by the Saddam Hussein led government may have been reactions to
distort reports, see Bennet, Lawrence and Livingston (2007) and Thomas (2006).
Recent studies have shown that media can aﬀect voting behavior (Prat and Stromberg, 2005; Gentzkow,
2006; Della Vigna and Kaplan, 2007; Chang and Knight, 2008; and Enikolopov, Petrova and Zhuravskaya,
2009), other political behavior (Olken, 2008; Paluck, 2008; Gerber, Karlan and Bergan 2009), and social
outcomes such as literacy (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008a), female empowerment (Jensen and Oster, 2008) and
fertility (La Ferrara, Chang and Duryea, 2007).
6We examine the content of all papers that are available for the main period of our study in the ProQuest
Historical database: the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles
Times and Christian Science Monitor.
For convenience, we will henceforth use the terms U.S. “government” and “State Department” interchange-
ably to mean the executive oﬃce and its administration. Similarly, we will use the term “public opinion” to
refer to voters and Congress. The logic for this relies on the assumption that Congress is more immediately
sensitive to public opinion. Since our data will not be rich enough to allow us to examine Congress and voters
separately, we refer to both of these parties as the “public” for convenience.
7For example, Stromberg (2004) provides evidence that the media can aﬀect government actions in ﬁnding
that public funds during the New Deal in the U.S. were more likely to be targeted at regions where there were
many radio listeners.
3Americans’ anxiety over problems in the Middle East after 9/11. In this case, the correlation
will show that U.S. strategic objectives and news coverage are highly correlated. But the
correlation will confound the eﬀect of U.S. strategic objectives and reader preferences and will
most likely overstate the true eﬀect of strategic objectives.
The principal contribution of this study is to address the aforementioned problems and
to provide empirical evidence on the causal eﬀect of strategic objectives on U.S. commercial
news coverage. First, we infer strategic objectives, which will be interchangeably referred to
as government bias in this paper, from the diﬀerence in the quantitative scores of reports of
human rights violations between what is published in the State Department’s (USSD) Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices relative to what is published in analogous reports by
Amnesty International, an independently ﬁnanced and operated human rights organization.
Interpreting this diﬀerence as U.S. government bias assumes that diﬀerences between U.S.
and Amnesty scores are driven by U.S. strategic objectives and that Amnesty reports are not
driven by U.S. reports. We need not assume that Amnesty reports the truth.
Second, to establish causality, we exploit the plausibly exogenous variation in stratgeic
objectives that results from an ally’s entry onto the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
We measure alliance using General Assembly (UNGA) voting patterns. The U.S. values
alliance and provides beneﬁts to its allies in return for the option value or realization of favors
such as supporting votes in the United Nations.8 The U.S.’s value for allies increases when
these countries enter onto the Security Council and have more opportunities to vote on issues
that are crucial to the U.S. Because uncertainty in factors such as domestic politics makes it
diﬃcult for allied countries to fully commit to their behavior on the Council in advance, this
increase in power over critical issues will be paralleled by an increase in beneﬁts from the U.S.
One form that the beneﬁts can take is favorable human rights reports. The reports are
valued by leaders of allied countries because favorable reports from the U.S. can inﬂuence
their prestige. More importantly, they inﬂuence U.S. Congressional support for the executive
administration’s foreign policies. By all appearances, the American public values good human
8The value for alliance is illustrated in Figures 3A and 3B which plot the average Political Terror Scale
(PTS) scores for U.S. allies and non-allies as reported by the U.S. State Department and Amnesty during
1976-2005. Allies are deﬁned as countries that voted with the U.S. more than the median country in the
sample on average. It shows that during the Cold War, the U.S. systematically reported its allies as having
better human rights behavior. However, after the Cold War, the scores of allies converge to those of non-allies.
In contrast, Amnesty reported U.S. allies and non-allies similarly before and after the Cold War.
4rights practices in foreign countries. Therefore, Congress will be less likely to object to pro-
viding support (e.g. military aid) for a country if that country is known to have acceptable
human rights practices. Conversely, Congress will be less likely to object to aggressive policies
towards a country if that country is known for human rights abuses. It follows that the gov-
ernment will then want to understate the abuses of its strategic allies relative to opponents
in government publications that are presented to Congress such as the State Department’s
annual Country Reports and in news outlets that deliver information to both members of
Congress and voters.9
Our strategy estimates a “ﬁrst stage” eﬀect of the interaction eﬀect of alliance and Council
membership on the diﬀerence between USSD and Amnesty reports and a “reduced form”
eﬀect of the interaction eﬀect of alliance and Council membership on news coverage of human
rights abuses. The ﬁrst estimate establishes the extent to which Council membership of
allied countries results in increased under-reporting of human rights abuses by the USSD,
and thus provide evidence for whether Council membership of allied countries caused the
U.S. government to strategically manipulate information about human rights abuses in these
countries. The second estimate provides evidence for the extent to which an increase in
strategic value to the U.S. government results in reduced coverage of human rights abuses in
the commercial press.10
The data are a country-level panel compiled from several existing sources. The two main
outcome measures are the diﬀerence in U.S. and Amnesty PTS scores of human rights abuses
and the number of stories about a foreign country’s human rights abuses published in six
national American newspapers.11
The results show that an increase in strategic value to the U.S. signiﬁcantly reduced
9Section 2 on the Background provides a more detailed discussion and documents the relevant qualitative
evidence on the relationship between the executive administration, Congress, media and the public.
10Because the Country Reports are just one of the many instruments the government can use to inﬂuence the
media, the interaction between alliance and UNSC membership is not an excludable instrument for Country
Reports for a structural estimate of the eﬀect of Country Reports on media coverage. See Section 4 for a
detailed discussion of the empirical strategy.
11We focus on the number of stories because we follow existing studies of the U.S. media in assuming that
it is costly for newspapers to publish inaccurate facts. Therefore, the margin for distortion will be in the
composition of stories. For example, a newspaper can choose between publishing two true stories on human
rights abuses; one is about the socialist Sandinistans and the other is about El Salvador, a U.S. ally. Our
estimates reveal the extent to which newspapers systematically chooses to publish stories of the former over
the latter.
5State Department scores of human rights abuses relative to Amnesty scores, and signiﬁcantly
reduced news coverage of abuses in the commercial press. For Cold War allies such as Brazil,
Zaire, Honduras and Chile, UNSC membership during the Cold War decreased newspaper
reports of abuses in these countries by approximately 29.5%, 66%, 57.4% and 82%.
The main results are consistent with the qualitiative evidence presented in Section 2.3
that the government is able to systematically inﬂuence news coverage. The main competing
explanation is that the results are driven by consumer preferences. In the empirical analysis,
we provide several pieces of evidence to suggest that this is not very likely in our context.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that the magnitudes of the eﬀects across newspapers are uncorrelated with
readership preferences.12 See Section 5.3 for a detailed dicusssion.
In addition, we provide suggestive evidence towards the mechanisms underlying the the
main results. Government inﬂuence can be achieved either directly by incentivizing journalists
and editorial boards, or indirectly by manipulating the supply of information to journalists. To
investigate the latter, we examine if the eﬀect of strategic objectives on news coverage is larger
when it is costlier for the newspaper to obtain independent information. Our results show
that the cost of independent information does not aﬀect the extent of government distortion,
which suggests that the main force behind government inﬂuence is most likely to be direct
government manipulation of the incentives of editorial boards and journalists.
Interestingly, our results show that the extent of government distortion is positively cor-
related with quality across newspapers. The higher the quality of news reporting, the larger
is the estimated eﬀect of government inﬂuence. In the Section 6, we discuss the potential
implications of this surprising stylized fact under the framework of government capture of the
media provided by Besley and Prat (2006).
For policy makers, scholars and practitioners of journalism, the results have a clear im-
plication. Independent ownership and market competition does not ensure the media from
government inﬂuence. In fact, there is much scope for government driven distortion even in
one of the largest and most competitive media markets in the world.
This study makes several contributions. First, it complements existing studies of the de-
terminants of news coverage which have primarily focused on the eﬀect of direct government
12Note that our empirical strategy is robust to the possibility that readers are more interested in news about
allies and expect the media to monitor the bad behavior of allies when they enter the Council because that
would bias against our ﬁnding that Council membership of allies cause under-reporting of bad behavior.
6ownership (Enikolopov, Petrova and Zhuravskaya, 2009; Durante and Knight, 2009) or con-
sumer driven distortions (e.g. Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005; and Gentzkow and Shapiro,
2006). To the best of our knowledge, our study is the ﬁrst to provide evidence that in-
dependently owned news outlets can be systematically inﬂuenced by the government. Our
ﬁndings also complement the theoretical work of Besley and Prat (2006) which predict that
in a competitive market, government capture is positively correlated with the quality of a
news outlet in equilibrium.13 Second, we add to the small but growing number of economic
studies exploring the causes and consequences of U.S. government foreign policy. Thus far,
these have been limited to outcomes that aﬀect foreign countries such as U.S. foreign aid (e.g.
Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Kuziemko and Werker, 2005), or outcomes for U.S. ﬁrms such as
stock prices (Dube, Kaplan and Naidu, 2009) and terms of trade (Easterly et al., 2009).14
Our study broadens the scope of this literature by examining the eﬀect of U.S. foreign policy
on the American public. Finally, we provide a measure of government bias and a source of
plausibly exogenous variation that can be easily used by future researchers in economics and
political science.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background of the Cold War
and the United Nations, and documents historical cases of government manipulation of the
media and the government’s use of human rights practices in portraying its strategic allies and
opponents. Section 3 describes the data used in this paper. Section 4 presents the empirical
strategy. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 interprets the results. Section 7 oﬀers
concluding remarks.
2 Background
This section has four aims. First, it describes the political competition between the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. during the Cold War and how this inﬂuenced the U.S.’s value of political alliance
during this era. Second, it describes the value of votes in the United Nations and how the
13In their paper, this is the prediction when news outlets choose the quality of reporting. See Section 6 for
a more detailed discussion.
14A related empirical literature examines the eﬀects of U.S. military operations on democracy in foreign
countries. See Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) for a review of the literature. See also Easterly, Satyanath
and Berger (2008). There is also a literature about the eﬀects of political interests on trade which typically
focus on the eﬀects of lobbying interest groups.
7additional power a country gains when it enters the Council together with a country’s inability
to fully commit to behave in accordance with U.S. interests will cause the U.S. to increase
bribes to allies when they are Council members. Third, we document known cases of govern-
ment interferences with news coverage during this period to provide some insight on some of
the methods the government used and the government’s motivation for inﬂuencing the media.
Finally, we document the government’s focus on portraying the human rights practices of their
allies favorably and of their opponents unfavorably.
2.1 The Cold War
The “Cold War”, which began after World War II in 1945 and lasted until 1989/91, refers to the
continuous political conﬂict, military tension and economic competition between the USSR
and its satellite states (consolidated by the Warsaw Pact 1955-91) and the United States and
Western Hemisphere allies (e.g. NATO, established 1949). Direct military attacks on adver-
saries were deterred by the potential for mutually assured destruction by deliverable nuclear
weapons. Therefore, rivalry between the two superpowers was expressed through military
coalitions, propaganda, espionage, weapons development, industrial advances, competitive
technological development, and numerous proxy wars. The Cold War spread to virtually ev-
ery region of the world, as the U.S., under the Marshall Plan, sought the containment and
rollback of communism and forged myriad alliances to this end; the U.S.S.R., under the Molo-
tov Plan, fostered Communist movements around the world (Gladdis, 2006). The periods of
the highest tension during the Cold War included the Berlin Blockade (1948-49), the Korean
War (1950-53), the Berlin Crisis (1961), the Vietnam War (1969-75), the Cuban Missile Crisis
(1962), and the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-89). Our study takes place in the context of
the last conﬂict.
The Cold War ended during 1989-91, when the Berlin Wall fell and the U.S.S.R. dissolved.
For the purpose of our paper, we loosely interpret 1989 as the end of the Cold War. At this
time, the strenuous competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for the alliance of smaller
countries ended. Past studies have argued that the U.S. favored its allies in terms of favorable
human rights reports (Stohl and Carleton, 1985; Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Poe, Carey
and Vasquez, 2001). Qian and Yanagizawa (2008) ﬁnd that the amount of under-reporting of
8human rights violations increases monotonically with the degree of alliance (e.g. the degree to
which a country votes with the U.S. and against the U.S.S.R. in the United Nations General
Assembly) during the Cold War and that this favoritism dissipates with the end of the Cold
War.15
2.2 The United Nations
The United Nations (UN) is the source of much of the diplomatic inﬂuence and the principal
outlet for the foreign relations initiatives of many developing countries. It was especially
important during the Cold War. Figure 1 shows that the number of issues in which the two
super-powers voted in opposition to each other escalated during this period of high political
tensions. Also, it shows that the fraction of countries that voted with the U.S. dramatically
increased after the Cold War ended. Together, they illustrate the marked division between
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the UN during the Cold War as well as the extent to which these
tensions inﬂuenced the voting patterns of member countries.
Two of the ﬁve principal organs of the United Nations are the General Assembly and the
Security Council. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is the only one in which all
member nations have equal representation. Its powers are to oversee the budget of the United
Nations, appoint the non-permanent members to the Security Council, receive reports from
other parts of the United Nations and make recommendations in the form of General Assembly
Resolutions. It currently has 192 countries, of which more than two-thirds are developing
countries. The General Assembly votes on many resolutions brought forth by sponsoring
states. Most resolutions, while symbolic of the sense of the international community, are not
enforceable as a legal or practical matter. The General Assembly does have authority to make
ﬁnal decisions in some areas such as the UN budget. More importantly, in case of a split
vote in the UNSC when no veto is exercised, the issue goes for vote in the General Assembly.
15A well known example that illustrates the decline of the U.S. value for Cold War allies after the Cold
War’s end is Zaire (renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997). Its president, Mobutu Sese Seko
(in oﬃce 1965-1997), a strong supporter of the U.S. during the Cold War, had been repeatedly criticized for
human rights abuses. However, during a state visit to the U.S. in 1983, U.S. president Ronald Reagan praised
Mobutu and said in response to the international criticism of Mobutu’s human rights abuses that he was a
“voice of good sense and good will”. Immediately after the Cold War ended, the State Department began
to criticize Zaire’s human rights violations. In 1993 Mobutu was denied a visa for visiting the U.S. At that
time, he remarked“I am the latest victim of the Cold War, no longer needed by the U.S. The lesson is that my
support for American policy [now] counts for nothing” (Gbadolite, 2001).
9The belief that voting with the U.S. in the UNGA is valuable to the U.S. is consistent with
the empirical ﬁnding that such votes are correlated with the amount of foreign aid received
from the U.S. (Alesina and Dollar, 2000) and the favorable under-reporting of human rights
violations by the U.S. State Department (Qian and Yanagizawa, 2008).
The UNSC is comprised of ﬁfteen member states. Council members have more power than
General Assembly members because the Council can make decisions which are binding for all
UN member states including economic sanctions or the use of armed force “to maintain or
restore international peace and security” (Chapter Seven of the UN Charter).16 There are ten
temporary seats that are held for two-year terms, each one beginning on January 1st. Five are
replaced each year. The members are elected by regional groups and conﬁrmed by the United
Nations General Assembly.17 There are ﬁve permanent members (P5): China, France, Russia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. These members hold veto power for blocking
adoption of a resolution.
Rotating members have substantial power on the Council. First, they have as much
inﬂuence as the P5 in setting the agenda. Second, although the P5 has the power to veto,
they rarely exercised this power during this period (Winter, 1996; O’Niell, 1996). This can
be seen from the fact that deadlocks, which can only occur if no member of the P5 vetoes a
resolution, have occurred ten times in the history of the UN. Nine of those occurred during
the Cold War.18 The fact that temporary members have inﬂuence in the Council is consistent
with the ﬁnding that they can result in higher U.S. foreign aid (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006;
Dreher et al., 2009).
The U.S.’s motivation to buy the votes of countries in the General Assembly and the
Security Council follow from the same logic as standard models of vote-buying and pork-
16This was the basis for UN armed action in Korea in 1950 during the Korean War.
17Africa elects three members; Latin America and the Caribbean, Asian, and Western European and others
blocs choose two members each; and the Eastern European bloc chooses one member. Also, one of these
members is an Arab country, alternately from the Asian or African bloc. Members cannot serve consecutive
terms, but are not limited in the number of terms they can serve in total. There is often intense competition
for these seats (Malone, 2000).
181956 Suez Crisis; 1956 Soviet Invasion of Hungary (Hungarian Revolution); 1958 Lebanon Crisis; 1960
Congo Crisis; 1967 Six Days War; 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; 1980 Israeli-Palestinian Conﬂict; 1981
South African occupation of Namibia (South West Africa); 1982 Israeli Occupation of the Golan Heights
(Golan Heights Law); 1997 Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict (East Jerusalem and Israeli-occupied territories).
The power of the votes from rotating members is consistent with the theoretical predictions by Voeten
(2001), who models bargaining power within the UNSC and ﬁnds that even though members of the P5 such
as the U.S. have unilateral power in vetoing resolutions, they prefer multilateral agreements.
10barrel politics (Kuziemko and Werker, 2005).19 These models would predict that the amount
of bribes is positively correlated with voting with the U.S.20
In this study, we assume that the U.S. values alliance in both the General Assembly and
the Security Council and that the value for alliance increases when a country enters the latter.
If allied countries could fully commit to voting favorably with the U.S. when they are on the
Council, then we should observe the U.S. giving allies a positive amount of bribes that is
relatively smooth over time. However, full commitment is highly unlikely in practice since
leaders of and political attitudes within allied countries can change in unpredictable ways.
Therefore, in order to guarantee good behavior from the ally on the Council in case a critical
issue arises, the U.S. must increase the amount of bribes during the allys’ two years on the
Council.21
2.3 Public Diplomacy
The main period of our study, 1976-1988, was characterized by an escalating commitment
to ﬁght communism on the part of the American government which climaxed during the
Reagan administration (1980-88). The government had several motives for inﬂuencing the
press coverage of its political allies. First, it was a way of inﬂuencing public opinion.22 Sec-
ond, and probably more importantly, inﬂuencing the press was an important way of aﬀecting
congressional opinion, whose favor was necessary for legislative purposes (Blanton, 2002).
During the 1980s, the Oﬃce of Public Diplomacy (OPD) was oﬃcially part of the State
Department and worked closely with the National Security Council (NSC). The explicit pur-
pose of the oﬃce was to inﬂuence public and congressional opinion to garner support for
19For empirical studies of U.S. Congressional committees, see for example, Ferejohn (1974), Ray (1981),
Groseclose and Stewart (1998), Stewart and Groseclose (1999), Levitt and Snyder (1997), Rundquist and
Carsey (2002); and Knight (2005). For theoretical studies, see for example, Riker (1962), Shepsle (1974),
Stratmann (1992), and Groseclose and Snyder (1996). An overview of the parallels between this literature on
practices of U.S. Congressional Committees and those of the United Nations Security Council is provided by
Kuziemko and Werker (2005).
20In the next section, we will observe voting patterns in the UNGA. But we will not examine voting patterns
in the UNSC because most issues are discussed prior to being put onto the agenda. Therefore, the sample of
issues voted on are not representative of the actual issues being deliberated by Council members.
21Appendix Table A1 provides suggestive evidence that U.S. allies receive more U.S. foreign aid, and this
increases when they enter the Council. The same relationship is not true for Oﬃcial Development Assistance
(ODA), or after the Cold War, ended when the U.S.’s value for alliance has presumably decreased.
22In the case of the The New York Times (which published an international version under the title of The
International Herald Tribune), manipulation could also aﬀect the opinion of foreign readers.
11the President’s strong anti-communist agenda in a “public action” program (Parry and Korn-
blub, 1988).23 The memo speciﬁes that audiences for the information campaign include the
Congress and the U.S. media. For the latter, the plan entailed making a list of media outlets
and identifying speciﬁc editors, commentators, talk shows and columnists (Jacobwitz, 1985).
There were many ways for the executive administration to inﬂuence Congress members.
Information can be disseminated through the numerous government aﬃliated publicity events
and publications. One such publication is the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
Every year, it is published by the State Department and submitted to Congress.24 The explicit
purpose of the reports are to serve as“a resource for shaping policy, conducting diplomacy and
making assistance, training and other resource allocations.25 While Congress is the primary
audience targeted by these reports, they are open to the public and therefore also available to
journalists. In this paper, we will use quantitative scores of these reports relative to the scores
of similar reports from Amnesty International to infer the government’s bias for or against a
country (e.g. government attitude or objectives).26
23For example, the following quotes demonstrate that the government intended to inﬂuence the media.
“The most critical special operations mission we have... today is to persuade the American people that the
communists are out to get us... If we win the war of ideas, we will win everywhere else.” – J. Michael Kelly,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force in a seminar the National Defense University attended by Oliver
North, 1983; and,“..we can and must go over the heads of our Marxist opponents directly to the American
people. Our targets would be within the United States, the Congress... the general public [and] media.” –
Kate Semerad, an external relationship oﬃcial at the Agency for International Development (AID) in 1983.
The plan for how to increase support for action against non-allies and turn public opinion against them is
made clear in a recently declassiﬁed action plan from 1985. It highlights the importance of portraying allies
as “religious freedom ﬁghters” while pointing out that non-allies are “puppets of the Soviets” who commit a
long list of human rights violations. To emphasize the importance of the latter in disgracing its opponents,
the memo lists potential human rights oﬀenses (e.g. forced conscription, persecution of the church).
24http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
25See the “Overview and Acknowledgements” from the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2003,
released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/29640.htm
26On average, we ﬁnd that the number of stories on human rights abuses in the NYT increases discretely
on in the three days following a release of the USSD Country Reports (see Appendix Figure A1). A similar
increase of smaller magnitude is found for the three days following the release of Amnesty reports.
There is also evidence that governments of foreign countries read State Department reports of abuses in
their countries. For example, in 1977, the Brazilian government in power (and the opposition party at the
time) responded angrily to a copy of the report on human rights abuses in Brazil that was handed to the
Embassy in D.C. by the State Department. See“Brazil Cancels Military Aid Treaty Over U.S. Report on
Human Rights” by the Associated Press, New York Times, Mar 12, 1977. In addition to oﬃcial publications,
the government can inﬂuence word-of-mouth information by having select information be read aloud into
Congressional record by sympathetic members of Congress, arranging meetings between sympathetic experts
and Congress members, or in the extreme planting false witnesses for personal testimony in congressional
committee hearings. In 1985 during a testimony to a hearing of the House Foreign Aﬀairs Subcommittee on
Western Hemisphere Aﬀairs, Tom Dowling arrived as a Roman Catholic Priest, and denounced Sandinista
12Government methods for inﬂuencing the media can be broadly categorized into two groups.
First, it can manipulate the supply of information. As with Congress, the government had
many instruments such as the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for disseminating
its points of view.27 In addition, disinformation was often released directly by the OPD.28
Second, the government can attempt to directly manipulate news reports by exerting pres-
sure on editorial boards or incentivizing journalists. The OPD monitored news reports by
the American media and would directly confront journalists and editors in order to convince
them to change the reports.29 Upon the appearance of news reports that did not conform
to the wishes of the OPD, oﬃcials would press the owners and editorial boards to change
their journalists in the ﬁeld.30 Similarly and perhaps most importantly, the OPD dealt di-
rectly with journalists using a carrot-and-stick strategy. For example, U.S. embassy oﬃcials
boasted in 1982 that they had forced New York Times correspondent, Raymond Bonner, out
of El Salvador because of his unfavorable reporting of that government, which was a U.S. ally.
human rights abuses to counter testimony of other religious ﬁgures about contra abuses. In 1985-86, Brigham
Young University student Wesley Smith published human rights reports alleging Sandinista atrocities. Later
it was discovered that Dowling was not an ordained priest and both he and Smith were paid by operatives
working for Oliver North (Parry and Kornclub, 1988).
27The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices are submitted annually by the U.S. Department of State
to the U.S. Congress in compliance with sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(FAA), as amended, and section 504 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. The law provides that the Secretary
of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate, by February 25" a full and complete report regarding the status of internationally recognized
human rights, within the meaning of subsection (A) in countries that receive assistance under this part, and
(B) in all other foreign countries which are members of the United Nations and which are not otherwise the
subject of a human rights report under this Act."
28In a letter to House Speaker Patrick Buchanan, the Deputy Director for Public Diplomacy for Latin Amer-
ican and the Caribbean (SLDP), Jonathan Miller described how the OPD was carrying out “white propaganda”
operations. This included writing opinion articles under false names and placing them in leading newspapers
such as the Wall Street Journal (Miller, 1985; Hamilton and Inouye, 1987). Similar opinion editorials were
planted in the New York Times and the Washington Post (Fascell, 1987). Another example occurred on the
night of Ronald Reagan’s re-election, Otto Juan Reich, the director of S/LPD, handed journalists a story
about how Soviet MiGs were arriving in Nicaragua that was later proven to be false (Cohen, 2001).
In general, the OPD ﬂooded the media, academic institutions and other interested groups with information.
For example, in just 1982, the OPD booked more than 1,500 speaking engagements with editorial boards, radio,
and television interviewers, distributed materials to 1,600 college libraries, 520 political science faculties, 122
editorial writers, and 107 religious groups. Extra attention was given to prominent journalists (Parry and
Kornblub, 1987).
29In a letter from Secretary of State, George Schultz, to President Reagan, Schultz discussed how Reich
spent several hours with the producers of CBS and successfully convinced them to change a forthcoming news
report on Cuba to favor the administration (Schultz, 1984).
30Bill Buzenberg, the foreign aﬀairs correspondent at National Public Radio during the 1980s recalled that
Reich said that he had “made similar visits to other unnamed newspapers and major television networks [and]
had gotten others to change some of their reporters in the ﬁeld because of a perceived bias”.
13Uncooperative journalists also became the targets of character assassination meant to induce
skepticism over the information they reported.31 In contrast, journalists seen as cooperative
to the administration’s agenda were rewarded with increased access to government informa-
tion. For example, an OPD memo stated that certain favorable correspondents had “open
invitations for personal brieﬁngs” (Cohen, 2001). The exclusive nature of this access presum-
ably made it valuable to journalists. In general, the executive administration had control
over information that was very valuable to journalists. For example, they controlled access to
interviews with important personnel, and even controlled who was allowed to ask questions
during administration press conferences.
Note that the main results from the empirical analysis estimate the reduced form eﬀect
of strategic objectives on news coverage. It will capture the eﬀects of both the distortion
of the supply of primary information as well as the eﬀects of more direct manipulation of
the incentives of journalists and editorial boards. Later in this paper, in Section 5.5, we will
attempt to investigate the contribution of the former indirectly by examining if the main
eﬀects are larger when it is more costly for the newspaper to obtain independent information.
Also, note that in light of the qualitative evidence of the many known cases of government
distortion, we will assume that journalists are aware of the government’s motive to manipulate
news coverage in interpreting the results.
2.4 Human Rights
Understating human rights abuses of allies and emphasizing those of opponents played a
prominent role in the U.S. government’s foreign policy during the Cold War. One of the ways
to shape public and congressional opinion against opponents was to exaggerate human rights
abuses in those countries and emphasize that they were “evil”. Conversely, the government
attempted to increase support for political allies by calling them “freedom ﬁghters”, “religious”
or simply “good” (Jacobwitz, 1985).
Human rights were important for reasons related both to foreign and domestic politics.
First, a perception of having good human rights practices is valuable because it is often
31Many were accused of being disloyal to the United States or having secret agendas. In 1985, the OPD
spread a story that certain American reporters had exchanged favorable reports on Nicaragua in exchange for
Sandinistan prostitutes. In a 1985 article in New York Magazine, Reich went further to say that“it [prostitutes]
isn’t only for women” and that the Nicaraguans provided men for gay journalists.
14tied to aid.32 Second, it is also valuable to the governments of foreign countries for non-
pecuniary reasons. For example, oﬃcial chastisement by a foreign government could decrease
the domestic prestige of a government.33 These two arguments are consistent with the long
history of incidents where the U.S. government withdrew aid or imposed trade sanctions on
countries because of human rights violations, and incidents where foreign countries rejected
U.S. aid that was tied to human rights practices.34 For the purposes of this paper, we take it
as given that countries value favorable external reports of its human rights practices.
In summary, the discussion from this section suggests that the U.S. government values
alliance for strategic reasons, and this value increases when an allied country becomes a
UNSC member. Membership will therefore cause the U.S. to increase the amount of bribes
to an allied country. The State Department will under-report abuse by allied governments
because foreign countries dislike negative reports on their human rights practices and because
Congress and voters prefer the U.S. to ally with and provide aid to governments with good
human rights practices. For similar reasons, the U.S. government may attempt to suppress
the amount of coverage of human rights abuses of its allies in the commercial media. Our
empirical strategy will estimate the eﬀect of strategic objectives on State Department reports
of human rights violations (relative to Amnesty International reports) and the amount of
32Jacobwitz (1985) suggests that much of this was motivated by the government’s desire to garner public
and congressional support for U.S. operations that aimed to overthrow ruling governments and the perception
that the public and Congress preferred that the U.S. not ally itself with governments that committed human
rights abuses. The latter is consistent with the fact that in our data, improving human rights practices by one
PTS point is correlated with a 10% increase in U.S. foreign aid. This estimate is statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. The standard error is 0.026. The estimation regresses the logarithm of U.S. foreign aid receipts
on the average of U.S. and Amnesty PTS scores, controlling for country and year ﬁxed eﬀects. They are not
reported in the paper for brevity.
33Similarly, hosting certain international events such as the Olympics is often viewed as a way of raising the
prestige of governments of developing countries. And human rights abuses is frequently used as a cause for
disqualifying countries from hosting. Alternatively, abuses described in the Country Reports may be a source
of information for people inside the country being reported on, and this information could be used against the
government in power.
34For example, in 1977, Congress insisted that the aid to Uruguay be made in installments contingent on
improvements in human rights. Uruguay’s displeasure at this was voiced when it “spurned” the aid (Onic,
1977). Less than two weeks later, the Brazilian government turned down the Carter administration’s oﬀer to
ask Congress for a 50 million dollar aid package when the State Department handed a copy of the Country
Report on human rights abuses in Brazil to the latter’s embassy in Washington D.C. In Brazil, this move was
extremely popular with the public and even the opposition party (AP, 1977). More recently, in June, 2008,
U.S. Commerce Secretary, Carlos Gutierrez, explained that the U.S. must continue its trade embargo on Cuba
because the latter “systematically brutalizes its people”. (Washington Post, 2008). Qian and Yanagizawa
(2008) provide more examples.
15coverage in six independently owned U.S. national newspapers. Note that for the latter, our
strategy will capture both the direct eﬀects of the government manipulating the incentives of
editorial boards and journalists and the indirect eﬀects of the government manipulating the
supply of primary information such as the Country Reports. See the Section 4 for a more
detailed discussion.
3 Data
This study combines data from several existing sources to form a country-level panel for 1976-
2005. The time span of the data is restricted by the availability of the PTS scores. We exclude
the former Soviet Republics. Many did not have membership in the UN before 1991. Their
exclusion should not aﬀect the results since they were unlikely candidates for U.S. alliance
during the Cold War. South Africa is omitted from the sample because it was excluded from
UN activities due to UN opposition to Apartheid. The ﬁve permanent members of the UNSC
are also excluded.35 We further restrict the sample to country-year observations where the
index is available for both Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department. Finally, we
focus our study on developing countries for which the UN is arguably the principal outlet of
foreign policy initiatives by restricting the sample to countries that are not classiﬁed as high
income countries as deﬁned by the World Bank.36 Our matched sample contains 104 countries
for thirty years.
For measuring alliance, we follow Qian and Yanagizawa (2008) by using the fraction of
votes in agreement with the U.S. on UNGA resolutions for which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (or
Russia after 1991) are divided (e.g. vote in opposing directions).37 Figure 1 plots the fraction
of divided votes over time. It shows that as Cold War tensions escalated in the 1980s, the
fraction of divided votes increased from approximatley 30% during the late 1970s to almost
35In 1978, China’s seat on the UNSC was transferred from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China. Neither
will be in our sample.
36High income countries are deﬁned to be those with 2007 GNP per capita of $11,456 or more. This
restriction is similar to the one made in Kuziemko and Werker (2005). Our results are very similar when we
do not make this restriction. The similarity is most likely due to the fact that high income countries, which
are mostly in Europe and North America, are allied to the U.S. or the USSR by treaty. Favorable human
rights reports and press coverage are not likely to be the main tools in which the U.S. government negotiates
with these countries. These results are omitted for brevity and available upon request.
37Each year there are approximately 100-150 resolutions in the UNGA, of which the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
disagree on approximately 70-90.
1670% in the late 1980s. Also plotted are the fraction of votes with the U.S. averaged over
all the divided votes each year.38 Our main measure of alliance is the fraction of votes a
country voted with the U.S. averaged over the period 1985-89. This period provides us with
the highest number of divided votes and therefore the best measure of alliance during this
period. We use a time-invariant measure of alliance because it is less likely to be an outcome of
changing U.S. favoritism than a time-varying measure, and more importantly, because using
voting patterns from years where there were very few divided issues produces a very noisy
measure of alliance.39 Figure 2A maps the alliance measure for the countries in our sample.
We arbitrarily deﬁne an ally to be countries that on average voted with the U.S. more than
the median country in the sample (approximately 7% of the time).
We do not make a separate measure of alliance based on voting patterns during the post-
Cold War period because there were many fewer divided issues and the change in the nature
of international relations when the world went from having two superpowers to one “hegemon”
means that the same measure could have very diﬀerent meaning. Note that we use the same
measure of alliance for the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. This makes interpreting the
eﬀects for the latter period diﬃcult as there was a large shift in alliance from the USSR to
the U.S. after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Hence, the results for the post Cold War
period should be interpreted very cautiously as suggestive evidence and we do not conduct a
triple diﬀerence estimation by using the Cold War sample as a placebo.
Data on UNSC membership is collected from The United Nations Security Council Mem-
bership Rollster.40 46 countries in the sample were on the UNSC as a rotating member at
least once during this time. They are listed in Appendix Table A2. 21 countries were on the
Council at least twice. Five countries were on the Council three times.
Human rights in the context of this study refers speciﬁcally to physical violence committed
38Our measure of alliance includes abstentions. Exluding them does not signiﬁcantly change either the
measure of alliance or the regression results. For brevity, we do not report those results in the paper.
39Our estimates are robust to changing the measure of alliance to be the average of votes during periods
between 1981 and 1989, when there were many divided votes. For brevity, we do not report estimates with
these alternative measures in the paper.
Using this measure, the top three allies of the U.S. and the fraction of divided issues they voted with the
U.S. during 1980-84 are: Turkey (0.4), Belize (0.28) and Costa Rica (0.27). The three countries that are least
allied are Mongolia (0), Lao PDR (0), and Czech Republic (0).
40See http://www.un.org/sc/list_eng5.asp for list of all countries that were ever members and the years of
their memberships.
17by the state onto civilians.41 Two of the main sources of information for human rights are the
United States State Department and Amnesty International, both of which publish annual
reports for almost every country in the world. Both the USSD and Amnesty use the same
deﬁnition for human rights abuses as set forth by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and publish reports using similar formats.42 The United States is the only country that
systematically releases its reports to the public. The way in which it gathers information is
not transparent. However, it is generally assumed that the reports are based on information
from government intelligence and diplomatic appratuses.43
Amnesty International is the only non-governmental organization which makes systematic
reports over the same broad scope and long time horizon.44 Amnesty deﬁnes its mission as “to
conduct research and generate action to prevent and end grave abuses of human rights and to
demand justice for those whose rights have been violated. Founded in the United Kingdom in
1961, Amnesty’s ﬁnance and management are independent of any government. It has oﬃces
in eighty countries and employ full time research teams that investigate reports of human
rights abuses, cross check and corroborate information from sources that include letters from
individuals or their representatives, refugees, diplomats, religious bodies, community workers,
humanitarian agencies, diplomats and other human rights defenders. Amnesty monitors news-
papers, websites and other media outlets. It also often sends fact-ﬁnding missions to assess
situations in the ﬁeld. While Amnesty is often perceived as having left-leaning sympathies,
the organization has actually received criticism for both alleged anti-Western and pro-Western
bias. Amnesty identiﬁes itself as an independent organization.45
Reports from these two agencies are individually scored beginning in 1976 by a group
of human rights scholars at the University of Carolina. The Political Terror Scale (PTS)
measures levels of political violence and terror that a country experiences in a particular
41This is the deﬁnition used by Freedom House, the PTS project, and the CIRI project.
42The declaration was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the 10th of December, 1948.
It arose directly from the experience of the Second World War and sets out, for the ﬁrst time, fundamental
human rights to be universally protected. It consists of thirty articles. The full text of the declaration can be
found at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.
43The wording of the reports also suggest that the information is mostly based on these sources.
44Amnesty is the only non-government human rights group that covers the entire world. The other is Human
Rights Watch (HRW), a U.S. based organization. However, the HRW does not systematically publish yearly
country reports. And their existing publications are not quantitavely scored by human rights databases.
45See Poe, Carey and Vasquez (2001) and Qian and Yanagizawa (2008) for quantitative comparisons of the
Amnesty and U.S. State Department measures and more detailed discussions.
18year based on a 5-level “terror scale” originally developed by Freedom House. This index is
available for 183 countries over the period 1976-2005. Relative to other measures of human
rights violations, the PTS extends the furthest back in time, to 1976.46 This determines the
time period of our study. Amnesty and the U.S. report identical PTS for 84% of our sample
on average and for 73% during the Cold War. We measure USSD reporting bias as Amnesty
PTS subtracted from USSD PTS. If the USSD reports a country as better than Amnesty,
then USit  Amnestyit < 0. For illustrative purposes, we divide the average of this diﬀerence
during the Cold War into ﬁve equal frequency groups and map it in Figure 2B. It shows that
under-reporting was most severe for Cold War allies such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
To better illustrate the relationship between alliance and favorable under-reporting from
the U.S. relative to Amnesty, we plot the PTS for U.S. allies and non-allies over time (using
the same deﬁnition of whether a country on average votes with the U.S. more or less than
the sample median as in Figure 2A). Figure 3A plots the U.S. PTS scores. The vertical band
indicates the end of the Cold War 1989-91. It shows that during the Cold War, the U.S.
systematically reported its allies as having better human rights than its non-allies. This gap
immediately converges after the Cold War ends. Interestingly, also note that the U.S. reports
all countries as having increasingly worse human rights as the Cold War tensions escalate
through the late 1970s and 1980s. Figure 3B plots the analogous relationship for Amnesty
PTS scores. The vertical axis has the same scale as Figure 3A for the purpose of comparison.
In contrast to the U.S., Amnesty reports allies and non-allies as having similar human rights
practices for both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Figure 3C plots the diﬀerence
between U.S. and Amnesty reports for allies and non-allies over time. It follows from the
previous two ﬁgures that during the Cold War, relative to Amnesty, the U.S. reported its
allies as having better human rights practices than non-allies. There is no diﬀerences after the
Cold War.47 Since alliance is correlated with many factors, this descriptive evidence cannot
show that the U.S.’s strategic value for allies has a causal eﬀect on its under-reporting of
46The CIRI Human Rights Data Project, like the PTS Project, reads the reports by Amnesty and the USSD
and provides a score. However, the CIRI incidices only begin in 1981. They also diﬀer from PTS in that they
attempt to provide disaggregated incidicies for the type of human rights. This means that while the two
indicies are correlated (approximatley 0.65-0.73), they are not directly comparable. See Wood and Gibney
(2009) for a detailed discussion.
47Figures 3A-3C plot the same relationship as the one plotted in Qian and Yanagizawa (2008). The sample
used here diﬀers in that the UNSC P5 are excluded.
19human rights. However, the fact that all of the changes between the diﬀerence in U.S. and
Amnesty scores are driven by changes in U.S. reports, and that favorable reports for allies
immediately end after the Cold War are very suggestive towards interpreting these changes
as driven by changes in U.S. strategic factors. Note also that Amnesty PTS scores ﬂuctuate
over time, which suggests that they contain information.
News coverage of human rights violations is measured as the number of articles about
human rights abuse in a given country. We calculate this number based on a search of the
text of articles in the ProQuest Historical and National Newspapers. We search for articles
containing the country’s name, the phrase “human rights” and at least one of the words or
phrases that fall under the UN Declaration for Human Rights (and that are therefore also
commonly used in news articles on human rights abuse). These include “torture”, “violations”,
“abuse”, “extrajudicial”, “execution”, “arbitrary arrests”, “imprisonment”and “disappearances”.
Our measure of human rights coverage is the total number of articles that results from the
search per country per year. We follow previous studies on the U.S. media in assuming that
media outlets will not report facts that are known to be false because proven inaccuracy could
cause a costly loss of reputation. Therefore, the margin for distortion is along the composition
of stories (e.g. report that the Sandinistas are committing human rights atrocities and omit
reports of similar abuses by the government of El Salvador, an ally of the U.S.).48
This study examines news reported by The New York Times (NYT), The Washington
Post, The Wall Street Journal (WSJ, only available 1976-91), The Chicago Tribune (only
available 1976-86) The Christian Science Monitor (CSM, only available 1976-97) and The Los
Angeles Times (L.A. Times). These are the only national newspapers for which we could
conduct a full text search for the main period of our study. For the Cold War period, we
have data for all six papers for 1976-1986 and ﬁve papers for 1987-88 (data for the Tribune is
only available until 1987). For the post-Cold War period, we do not have data for the WSJ
or the Chicago Tribune and the CSM is only available until 1997. The papers in our sample
were arguably some of the largest metropolitan newspapers in the U.S. during the 1980s. The
48This is a similar mechanism to the crowding-out of news found in Eisensee and Stromberg (2004). They
show that U.S. emergency disaster relief depends on whether the disaster occurs at the same time as other
newsworthy events, that are obviously unrelated to need. They are argue that the explanation for this result
is that relief spending is driven by news coverage, and the other newsworthy material crowds out this news
coverage.
20NYT and Washington Post had particularly good reputations for the breadth and depth of
their news coverage.49 These two newspapers have more foreign correspondents than other
U.S. newspapers. The fact that we are only using large newspapers that typically write their
own stories means that the eﬀects we measure will not likely be confounded by information
herding. Our measure includes both articles written by journalists from these papers and
stories picked up from newswires and other sources.50
We use three measures to proxy for a newspaper’s cost of obtaining independent informa-
tion. First, we use an indicator for the freedom of domestic press from the Freedom House
data. It reﬂects a newspaper’s ability to pick up stories from independent sources inside a
foreign country. This measure ranges from zero to two. Zero indicates no freedom. And
two indicates a free press.51 This measure is produced annually beginning in 1980. We will
use a time invariant measure, calculated as the average measure during 1980-1988, to cap-
ture overall media access. This avoids the potential problem that changes in media freedom
within a country over time may be correlated with UNSC membership. For interpretational
ease, we create a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the average media freedom
index is above zero. This dummy variable indicates whether a country experienced any media
freedom during 1980-88. The second measure is the number of newswire stories about human
rights abuses in a country. We obtain this measure from the ProQuest Database using the
same search algorithm as for U.S. newspapers. This measures a newspaper’s access to inde-
pendent reports from news agencies such as the Associated Press (AP) or the United Press
International (UPI). Note that newspapers pay a ﬁxed subscription fee for access to newswire
stories. The marginal cost for each story is zero conditional on having a subscription. All of
49For example, the NYT has received 101 Pulitzer Awards for Journalism, far more than any other news-
paper. Over thirty of these were awarded for reporting on international news. It’s reputation for reporting
accurate news independent of the wishes of the parties being reported on is strengthened by famous incidents
such as The Pentagon Papers, where the NYT reported a series of stories based on information leaked to it by
a member of the Nixon administration and then fought the Nixon administration in the U.S. Supreme Court
in order to overcome an injunction that was placed on it after the ﬁrst stories were printed. In terms of the
number of Pulitzers for news, the NYT is followed by the Washington Post and the Associated Press.
50The source of the story is often embedded within an article. Therefore, we were not able to accurately
and systematically distinguish between articles written by diﬀerent sources. This should not aﬀect the inter-
pretation of our estimates as the reduced form strategy captures the eﬀects of government objectives on both
journalists’ decision to report a story and the editorial decision to publish stories which from all sources. See
Appendix Figure A2 for a plot of the annual number of articles on human rights abuses for all countries over
time.
51For example, Afghanistan is rated as zero and Australia is rated as two.
21the newspapers in our samples have full subscriptions. Finally, we proxy for the cost for a
foreign correspondent to travel to the location of the story.52 This is the geographic distance
from national capitals to the nearest foreign bureau oﬃces. We were only able to obtain the
Cold War locations of oﬃcies for the NYT.53 Figure 2C shows a map of our media freedom
variable as well as the NYT foreign bureau oﬃces.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. On average, the USSD reports countries as
being 0.14 index points better in terms of human rights violations relative to Amnesty. The
level of alliance with the U.S. is approximately 9% on average. (The median level of alliance,
which we used earlier for Figures 2A, 3A-3C is 7%. It is not reported in Table 1). On average,
approximately eleven stories on human rights abuses are published in all six newspapers per
country per year. Most of these stories are featured in the Washington Post, NYT and L.A.
Times. Newswires provide roughly the same number of stories on human rights abuses as the
six U.S. papers together in our sample combined. The average distance between the national
capital of a country and the nearest NYT foreign oﬃce bureau is 1,463 km. Forty percent of
the sample have no media freedom domestically according to Freedom House.
4 Empirical Strategy
In this study, we estimate two causal relationships, the eﬀect of an increase in a country’s
strategic value to the U.S. on the diﬀerence between the USSD and Amnesty PTS scores;
and the eﬀect of an increase in a country’s strategic value to the U.S. on the number of
stories of abuses in U.S. newspapers. As was described in the introduction, we face two main
diﬃculties. The ﬁrst is reverse causality. Are strategic objectives driving government and
commercial news reports of human rights abuses? Or are they responding to the latter? The
second is the problem of omitted variable bias. This is particularly problematic in estimating
the eﬀect of strategic objectives on news reports because both may be outcomes of a third
factor, such as public opinion.
52An average newspaper foreign bureau costs approximately $300,000 per year. The major costs have been
cited as rent, travel and the reporters’ salaries (Caroll, 2007).
53The NYT has foreign bureau oﬃces in Mexico City, Caracs, Rio de Janeiro, London, Paris, Berlin (West
Berlin), Bogota, Shanghai, Frankfurt, Rome, Jerusalem, Beirut, Cairo, Istanbul, New Delhi, Dakar, Nairobi,
Johannesburg, Moscow, Beijing, and Hong Kong. The distance, measured in kilometers, comes from data on
the between cities of the world provided by Kristian Skrede Gledisch of the University of Essex.
22To address these, we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in a country’s strategic value
to the U.S. from the combination of alliance to the U.S. and entry into (and exit from) the
UNSC. We will estimate a “ﬁrst stage” eﬀect of the interaction eﬀect of alliance and Council
membership on the diﬀerence between USSD and Amnesty reports and a “reduced form”
eﬀect of the interaction eﬀect of alliance and Council membership on news coverage of human
rights abuses. The ﬁrst estimate establishes the extent to which Council membership of allied
countries result in increased favorable under-reporting of human rights abuses by the USSD,
and thus provide evidence for whether Council membership of allied countries increase their
value to the U.S. government. The second estimate provides evidence for the extent to which
an increase in strategic value to the U.S. government results in reduced coverage of human
rights abuses in the commercial press. Because the Country Reports are just one of the many
instruments the government can use to inﬂuence the media, the interaction between alliance
and UNSC membership is not an excludable instrument for a structural estimate of the eﬀect
of Country Reports of news coverage.
The eﬀect of an increase in government strategic value of a country on U.S. government
bias towards this country can be characterized as the following.
USSDit   Amnestyit = (U:S:Alliancei  UNSCit) + Xit + i + t + "it (1)
The diﬀerence in USSD and Amnesty PTS scores in country i in year t is a function of: the
interaction term between alliance to the U.S., U:S:Alliancei, and membership on the UNSC,
UNSCit; a vector of country-year speciﬁc controls such as Amnesty’s reported PTS, Xit;
country ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects. All the diﬀerences across countries that do not
change over time are controlled for by country ﬁxed eﬀects. All the changes over time that
aﬀect all countries similarly, such as American attitudes towards human rights, are controlled
for by year ﬁxed eﬀects. We control for the score of Amnesty reports because we are interested
in the eﬀect of U.S. reports when the U.S. and Amnesty diﬀer, and for most of the time,
approximately 73% during 1976-88, the U.S. and Amnesty report similar scores. Therefore,
controlling for Amnesty scores will improve the precision of the second stage estimates; it does
not aﬀect the coeﬃcients. All standard errors are clustered at the country level.54 Higher PTS
54Note that controlling for Amnesty PTS in equation (1) where it is also on the left hand side will only be
problematic if there is measurement error in PTS scores. We have no reason to believe that this is the case.
23reﬂects worse human rights conditions. Therefore, if the U.S. favors its allies when they are
on the Council with milder reports of human rights abuses, ^  < 0.
We specify alliance as a continuous measure mainly for convenience. In theory, without
knowing the U.S.’s production function of acquiring favorable votes, it is not possible to predict
the functional form of the amount of bribes necessary across diﬀerent levels of alliance. To
address this in practice, we ﬁrst estimate a ﬂexible equation where we allow alliance to vary.55
We ﬁnd that the eﬀects of Council membership are broadly monotonically increasing in the
level of alliance (Appendix Table A3) and therefore, for simplicity, will use a linear measure
as the main speciﬁcation in our paper.56
To interpret  as the causal eﬀect of an increase in strategic value to the U.S., we need
to assume that an ally’s entry and exit from the UNSC did not aﬀect the diﬀerence in PTS
scores through any channel other than U.S. strategic value. There are two main concerns for
how this can be violated. First, there is the possibility that allies behave better when they
enter the the Council and that the U.S. government has better information about this than
Amnesty (e.g. Amnesty is less competent). Second is the related possibility that the eﬀect
is driven by Amnesty’s bias. For example, when an U.S. ally enters the UNSC, a potentially
left-leaning Amnesty may decide to exaggerate human rights abuses in that country. There’s
little reason to believe that either of these possibilities are very likely. Countries typically
have worse human rights practices when they enter the Council on average (see Section 5 on
the Empirical Results). Similarly, Figures 3A-3C in Section 3 have shown that the diﬀerence
in reports during the Cold War versus afterwards is entirely driven by the USSD. But for
55We divide the observations into three equal frequency groups according to alliance and create dummy
variables for whether a country belongs to the group of “non-allies”, “median allies”, or “strong allies”. We
then estimate a equation similar to equation (1), where the interaction term U:S:AllianceiUNSCit is replaced
by two interaction terms: MedianAlliancei  UNSCit and StrongAlliancei  UNSCit. The estimates are
shown in Appendix Table A1. Estimates in Column (1) show that the eﬀect of being on the UNSC on U.S.
under-reporting is increasing with alliance.
56Theoretical models of pork-barrel politics and federal spending in the U.S. predict that political patronage
absent concerns for re-election will cause redistribution to be disproportionately higher for groups that support
the ruling party. If reelection becomes a concern, then redistribution will go towards marginal (“swing”) voters.
(For theoretical studies, see for example, Snyder, 1989; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Cox and McCubbins,
1986. For empirical studies on the determinants and patterns of politically motivated redistribution, see for
example, Dahlberg and Johanssen, 2002; Case, 2001; Miguel and Zaidi, 2003; Dasgupta, Dhillon, and Dutta,
2003; Khemani, 2004; and Cole, 2009). Since the U.S. is not concerned with re-election in the UN and since
the allies in our sample are eﬀectively “marginal” voters (the strongest ally, Turkey, only votes with the U.S.
40% of the time in the UNGA), our ﬁnding that the U.S.’s strategic value of a country increases with their
alliance could be consistent with either model.
24caution, we investigate these possibilities in two ways. We examine the eﬀect on USSD and
Amnesty scores separately to see if changes in the diﬀerence between these two agencies are
driven by changes in the USSD or Amnesty. We also repeat the same estimation for the period
after the Cold War under the assumption that the U.S.’s value for allies have decreased. Note
that using the post-Cold War period as a comparison faces the diﬃculties that we described
earlier in Sections 2 and 3, and therefore should only be interpreted as illustrative supporting
evidence.
In addition to the main estimates, we can examine the timing of the eﬀect of entry and
exit onto the Council more precisely by estimating the following equation (2), which allows us
to observe whether the additional beneﬁts to allies of being on the UNSC are only experienced




c(U:S:Alliancei1  c)+Xit+c+U:S:Alliancei+t+"itc (2)
The diﬀerence in U.S. and Amnesty reports for country i in year t, c years since it is
a UNSC member, is a function of: the interaction between a dummy variable indicating
the number of years since UNSC membership,c, and a continuous measure of U.S. alliance,
U:S:Alliancei; dummy variables for the number of years since membership, c; the score of
Amnesty reports, the U.S. alliance main eﬀect, and year ﬁxed eﬀects. If the U.S. bias arises
mainly from an increase in an ally’s strategic value in being on the council during the Cold
War, then there should be no correlation for the two years leading up to being a member and
the two years immediately following, ^  2; ^  1;2; ^ 3  0, and negative eﬀects for the two years
on the council, ^ 0; ^ 1 < 0 during the Cold War.
The second relationship we estimate is the reduced form eﬀect of an increase in a country’s
strategic value to the U.S. on news coverage of its human rights abuses in U.S. newspapers.
We repeat equation (1), replacing the diﬀerence in PTS scores with the natural logarithm of
news stories as the dependent variable. We use the logarithm of the number of articles to
reduce the weight placed on a few high proﬁle countries which are frequently written about
for reasons that presumably have little to do with changes in actual human rights situations
25in their countries.57 If there are zero articles for a country in a given year, we take the natural
logarithm of 0.1. Therefore, country-year observations with zero articles are not dropped from
the sample. The estimates are very similar if they are dropped from the sample. See Section
5.3 on robustness for a more detailed discussion.
For causal interpretation, we must assume that an ally’s entry onto and exit from the
UNSC does not aﬀect news coverage of its human rights abuses through any channel other
than strategic objectives. For example, if readers are more interested in allies, and this interest
increases when they are on the Council, then the estimated eﬀects could be confounded by
reader preferences.58 This seems unlikely ex-ante since knowledge surveys show that only 15%
of Americans can name the Secretary General and that less than 16% of Americans can name
an agency within the UN (Alger, 2005: p. 59). Moreover, the most plausible reader preference
is arguably to expect the media to monitor the bad behavior of U.S. allies when they enter the
UNSC. This would bias against our estimates of the eﬀect on under-reporting of bad behavior.
For our result to be consumer driven, consumers would need to desire fewer stories of bad
behavior, or fewer news stories overall when allies enter the Council. We will address this by
estimating the eﬀect of government distortion for each newspaper separately and examining
whether the extent of distortion correlates with measures of readers’ preferences. See section
on robustness for details.
Our main empirical strategy estimates the reduced form eﬀect of an increase in strategic
value to the U.S. government on news coverage. To investigate the extent to which government
inﬂuence is achieved through direct manipulation of the incentives of journalists and editorial
boards or indirectly by manipulating the supply of primary information, we will estimate the
eﬀect of the triple interaction term of alliance, UNSC membership, and a measure for the
cost of obtaining independent information, U:S:Alliance  UNSC  IndependentInfoCost.
For example, if newspapers relied on several sources for information, one of which is the U.S.
government, then newspapers’ inference of the truth will vary with government reports. If
news outlets are cost minimizing, then it follows that the eﬀect of strategic objectives on
57For example, since 2000, human rights is mentioned in most of the news articles about China even if the
main focus of the article is about an unrelated topic. The number of articles on Chinese human rights are just
as likely to be correlated with the occurence of the Olympic Games as with changes in strategic value to the
U.S. or actual changes in the conditions for human rights.
58See studies by Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) for examples of how
consumer preferences can drive news coverage.
26news coverage will be larger when it is more costly for news outlets to obtain information
from non-government sources. We will use three diﬀerent measures of cost: access to stories
from independent foreign domestic press (e.g. Freedom House measure for media freedom),
the number of newswire stories on abuses in a country, and the travel cost for a journalist
from a U.S. newspaper to report personally (e.g. distance between national capitals and the
nearest foreign oﬃce bureau of a U.S. newspaper). If information asymmetries facilitate the
government in inﬂuencing news coverage, then the coeﬃcient on this triple interaction term
will be positive and signiﬁcant.
5 Results
5.1 The Eﬀect of U.S. Strategic Objectives on State Department
Bias
Table 2 shows the estimated eﬀects from an increase in a country’s strategic value to the U.S.
on USSD reports of human rights abuses for that country relative to Amnesty from equation
(1). Panel A shows the estimates for the Cold War era. To illustrate the alliance main eﬀect,
we estimate the eﬀects controlling for the U.S. alliance main eﬀect instead of country ﬁxed
eﬀects as in the main speciﬁcation. The estimate for U.S. alliance in Column (1) shows that
alliance is negatively correlated with reports of human rights by the U.S. In contrast, the
estimate in Column (3) shows that alliance is uncorrelated with Amnesty reports.
Column (2) shows the country ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation. Council membership for a country
that always votes with the U.S. in the UNGA decreases USSD reports of its human rights
abuses by approximately three index points. The estimate is statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% level. Column (4) shows that the eﬀect on Amnesty reports of human rights abuses have
the opposite sign, is much smaller in magnitude and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Columns (5)-(9) examine the eﬀect on the diﬀerence between USSD and Amnesty scores.
Column (5) shows that alliance is on average correlated with the USSD under-reporting human
rights abuses relative to Amnesty. Column (6) controls for country ﬁxed eﬀects. Column (7)
presents estimates from the main speciﬁcation that controls for country ﬁxed eﬀects and
Amnesty scores. It shows that conditional on Amnesty reports, Council membership of a
27country that always votes with the U.S. during the Cold War decreases USSD reports of
human rights abuses relative to Amnesty by 3.56 index points. This estimate is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Since the median country voted with the U.S. 7% of the time, the
eﬀect for the median country can be approximated by multiplying the coeﬃcients by 0.07.
Therefore, Council membership for the median country results in a 0.25 reduction in PTS
score from the U.S. relative to Amnesty.
Since the empirical strategy is based on UNSC membership, we next restrict our sample
to the 46 countries that were ever on the UNSC. Column (8) shows that the estimates on this
restricted sample are similar in magnitude and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. To see
if our results are driven by outliers, we plot the residuals from the regression in Column (8).
Figure 4A shows that the eﬀect is largest for Zaire, which is an outlier in the eastern region
of the plot. However, the dense cloud of observations along the regression line shows that
even with the omission of Zaire, our estimates will be robust. Indeed, the estimate in Column
(9) from using a sample of countries that were on the UNSC at least once and where Zaire is
omitted are similar in magnitude although less precisely estimated. The residuals from this
regression are plotted in Figure 4B.
Panel B shows the analogous estimates on the post-Cold War sample, when the U.S.’s
strategic value of allies had decreased. Comparing Columns (1) and (2) with (3) and (4)
shows that Council membership for allies have similar eﬀects on Amnesty and U.S. reports
after the Cold War. Neither are statistically signiﬁcant. The estimates in Columns (5)-(9)
for the eﬀect on the diﬀerence in USSD and Amnesty PTS are much smaller in magnitude
than the Cold War estimates, have the opposite sign (Columns (6)-(9)), and are statistically
insigniﬁcant.
In addition to the main results, there are several important pieces of evidence in Table 3
that support the argument that the eﬀect of UNSC membership for U.S. allies comes through
changes in U.S. strategic value. First, note that Columns (2) and (4) in Panel A demonstrate
that the eﬀect on the diﬀerent PTS scores is driven by changes in USSD reports, not Amnesty
reports. Second, we see that being allied to the U.S. in terms of UNGA voting is positively
correlated with the USSD under-reporting human rights (Panel A Column 1), but has no
eﬀect on Amnesty’s reports (Panel A Column 3). Finally, a comparison of the estimates in
Panels A and B show that these main eﬀects of U.S. alliance decreases in magnitude after
28the Cold War, when strategic value of allies have arguably decreased. These results provide
very suggestive evidence for our claim that our strategy is capturing changes in U.S. strategic
value.
Next, we investigate the timing of these eﬀects. Since UNSC membership is obtained
through elections, one may expect the beneﬁt of Council membership to begin before the
oﬃcial term begins. Alternatively, winning a seat on the Council may be correlated with
other factors that could aﬀect U.S. PTS scores relative to Amnesty. While there is no reason
to believe that these factors are also correlated with U.S. alliance, ﬁnding that the beneﬁt of
Council membership to allies exists even when the two year term is over would cast doubt
on the validity of our empirical strategy. Thus, we estimate equation (2) for Cold War and
post-Cold War years. The estimates are shown in Appendix Table A4 along with F-statistics
for the joint signiﬁcance of the two years on the Council. As before, we are interested in the
main eﬀect of U.S. alliance. The estimates show that it is negatively correlated with reports
from the USSD relative to Amnesty during the Cold War but not after the Cold War. The
coeﬃcients for the interaction terms of alliance and dummy variables for the number of years
since Council membership are plotted separately in Figure 5. The solid red line shows the
estimated eﬀect of Council membership for a country that always votes with the U.S. for each
of the two years before it enters the Council, the two years on the Council, and the two that
follows. It shows that the beneﬁts occur during the two years on the Council. There are no
eﬀects before or after. The discreteness in the change in beneﬁts of UNSC membership when
allies enter or exit from the UNSC is consistent with the belief that countries cannot fully
commit to voting with the U.S. before they enter the Council. The dashed blue line plots
the coeﬃcients for the post-Cold War era. It show that there is no beneﬁt, before, during,
or after Council membership. The ﬁndings that the eﬀects occur during the two years on
the Council, and only during the Cold War are both consistent with our empirical strategy
capturing changes in countries’ strategic values to the U.S.
5.2 The Eﬀect of U.S. Strategic Objectives on News Coverage
Table 3 shows the estimated eﬀects of Council membership for U.S. allies on U.S. newspaper
coverage of human rights abuses. As with the estimates shown in Table 2, we ﬁrst show the
29estimates with U.S. alliance main eﬀects and then with country ﬁxed eﬀects. Panels A and B
show the estimates for the Cold War and post Cold War period. Panel A Column (1) shows
that Council membership and alliance with the U.S. is correlated with more coverage on human
rights abuses in U.S. newspapers. Column (2) presents the baseline estimates controlling for
country ﬁxed eﬀects. Like the estimate in Column (1), the estimate for the main eﬀect for
UNSC membership shows that on average newspaper write more articles of abuse of Council
members. The estimate for the interaction eﬀect show that Council membership for a country
that always votes with the U.S. reduces news coverage of human rights abuses by 9.3 log
points. Therefore, for the median country, Council membership reduces coverage by 0.65 log
points, or 48%. The estimate is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Column (3) shows that
the estimated eﬀect is unchanged when the sample is restricted to countries that were ever on
the Council. Figure 4C plots the residuals of this regression. It shows that, as before, Zaire
is an outlier. Column (4) shows the estimate on the sample restricted to countries that were
ever in the UNSC and where Zaire is excluded. The estimated eﬀect is larger in magnitude
and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The partial correlation plot of the residuals are
plotted in Figure 4D.
Panel B presents the estimates for the post-Cold War period. The estimates of the inter-
action of UNSC and alliance are smaller in magnitude relative to the Cold War estimates and
are not statistically signiﬁcant. In many cases, the signs are also diﬀerent. The main eﬀect
of alliance with the U.S. is strikingly diﬀerent. During the Cold War, the correlation was
approximately 4-4.6 and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Afterwards, it was reduced
to approximately zero and is statistically insigniﬁcant. This is suggestive that our strategy is
capturing the eﬀects of U.S. objectives.
As with the ﬁrst stage estimates, there are several pieces of evidence here that support our
claim that the interaction eﬀects capture the eﬀect of an increase in strategic value to the U.S.
Note that the estimated coeﬃcient of the U.S. alliance main eﬀect in Panel A is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant. This means that on average allies receive more coverage on human
rights abuses in newspapers. Similarly, the coeﬃcient for the dummy variable indicating that
a country is a UNSC members is positive, which means that on average UNSC members
receive more news coverage of human rights abuses. It is only the interaction of alliance and
membership that decreases coverage. We will discuss the implications of these estimates for
30our interpretation later in the paper when we explore alternative hypotheses.
5.3 Robustness
One concern in interpreting the main estimates is that we are capturing spurious country
speciﬁc trends. It seems unlikely that such trends are speciﬁc to levels of alliance and UNSC
membership. For caution, we address this possibility by controlling for country-speciﬁc time
trends. For each country, this will control for any change over time that is roughly linear.
For brevity, we only present estimates for the Cold War years in Table 4. Panel A shows the
eﬀects on the diﬀerence in USSD and Amnesty PTS scores. Column (1) shows the baseline
estimate without controlling for country speciﬁc time trends. Column (2) adds this control.
They are both statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level and similar in magnitude. Columns
(3) and (4) show the estimates controlling for country speciﬁc time trends for the restricted
sample of countries that were ever on the UNSC, and countries that were ever on the UNSC
excluding Zaire. The estimates are very similar in magnitude as those in Columns (1) and (2)
but less precisely estimated.59
Panel B shows the estimated eﬀects for newspaper coverage of human rights stories. Col-
umn (1) shows the estimate for the full sample without controlling for country-speciﬁc trends.
Column (2) shows that the magnitude of the coeﬃcient decreases when the country speciﬁc
year trends are added as controls. However, the two estimates are not statistically diﬀerent
from each other. Columns (3) and (4) shows that as with the main estimates, the estimates
with country-speciﬁc time trends change little when the sample is restricted to countries ever
on the UNSC and increases in magnitude when Zaire is further omitted. For back of the enve-
lope calculations, we will use the estimates in Column (3) which are the most conservative in
magnitude and statistically signiﬁcant. They imply that for the median country, entry onto
the Council decreases news coverage by approximately 42%.
Next, we check that our estimates are robust to restricting the sample to years when
the Reagan Administration was in power (1980-88). Since Cold War tensions increased and
59Note that the possibility that our main results are capturing spurious time trends are not high ex ante
as we have already shown that the eﬀect of UNSC membership on USSD under-reporting discretely increased
when an ally entered the Council and discretely decreased back to pre-Council levels when the ally exited.
However, in repeating the same yearly estimates for news coverage, we found that the estimates were very
imprecise. This is most likely because of the many observations for which there were no news articles on
human rights abuses. They are not reported in the paper for brevity and available upon request.
31the apparatus for inﬂuencing the public opinion such as the OPD was strengthened during
this administration, we should ﬁnd that the main results are robust to the exclusion of the
Carter years. Columns (5)-(8) of Table 5 show that this is indeed the case. The estimates are
essentially unchanged when we restrict the sample.
Third, we check whether the linear speciﬁcation is robust to censoring since many countries
have no articles written in U.S. newspapers on their human rights abuses. Approximately 40%
of the Cold War sample is observations where the value for the number of stories on human
rights abuse in newspapers is zero. The OLS estimates on this censored distribution will be
biased if the eﬀects are mostly caused by the number of news stories being increased from
zero to one. To investigate this, we repeat the main estimation on a sample restricted to
observations that had at least one story on human rights abuses in U.S. newspapers on a
given year. The estimated eﬀects are similar in magnitude between the full and restricted
samples. This suggests that increasing the number of news stories from zero to more than
zero is not the main margin for the main results. Similarly, the results are statistically similar
when we use an alternative Tobit speciﬁcation to address the potential censoring problem (see
Appendix Table A5). The magnitude is nearly identical to the estimates in Table 4 Panel B
Columns (2)-(3), which we use for our calculations later in the paper.
5.4 Alternative Explanations
This section investigates whether the eﬀects on news coverage can also be due to consumer
preferences. For brevity, we only discuss and report results for the Cold War period.
There are two ways in which consumer preferences can drive our results. First, our identi-
ﬁcation assumption may be violated if UNSC membership of allies aﬀect readers’ interests in a
country. Assuming that Americans prefer allies or countries with political power to have good
human rights practices, the most likely scenario would be one where readers expect media
outlets to increase monitoring of bad behavior of allies when they are on the UNSC. This is
consistent with our ﬁnding that the level of alliance with the U.S. and UNSC membership
are each positively correlated with news coverage on human rights abuses (see Table 3 Panel
A). However, this scenario will bias against our ﬁnding that an ally’s entry onto the UNSC
decreases news coverage of bad behavior. To bias our results upwards, preferences would have
32to be such that consumers dislike hearing about bad behavior of UNSC members, and the
strength of this preference is increasing in alliance. This runs contrary to the correlations
between the main eﬀects of U.S. alliance, UNSC membership and news coverage shown in
Table 3.60
Consumer preferences can also explain the main results if readers derive utility from hearing
the government’s version of events. For example, it may be important to know that the
President thinks that a certain country is “evil” even if one disagrees with the view. Note
that this is not a issue of internal validity. But it is important for considering the welfare
impacts of news distortions. The welfare reduction will be smaller if readers value hearing
whatever the government says. We explore this possibility indirectly by examining whether
the extent of government distortion across papers correlates with the characteristics of the
readers of each paper. We use two proxies of readership attitudes: a ranking according to
the 2008 Mondo Conservativeness Rating and a ranking according to the measure of media
slant taken from Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006). Together with the estimated eﬀects for each
paper shown in Table 5 Columns (2)-(7), these provide two stylized facts that are inconsistent
with the consumer driven hypothesis. Table 5 Column (1) shows the estimate for the sum
from the main results. Columns (2)-(7) shows the estimated eﬀects on The Washington Post,
NYT, WSJ, The Chicago Tribune, The L.A. Times and the CSM. The estimates show that
the estimated eﬀects for the ﬁrst three newspapers are large in magnitude and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The estimated eﬀect for The Chicago Tribune, The L.A. Times
and the CSM have the same signs as the ﬁrst group of papers. But they are much smaller in
magnitude and statistically insigniﬁcant. Next, we use bivariate regressions to estimate the
correlations between the estimated eﬀects for each paper and conservativeness rankings. The
residuals and regression lines are plotted in Figures 6A and 6B. Figure 6A shows that there
is no relationship between distortions and a ranking based on the Mondo Conservativeness
Rating. Figure 6B shows that the estimated eﬀects are also uncorrelated with Gentzkow
and Shapiro’s (2006) measure of media slant. These correlations should be interpreted very
cautiously as there are only six newspapers in the sample and both measures of readership
preferences are based on data many years after the main period of our study. Therefore, they
60Ideally, we would like to have a measure of true human rights behavior or a measure that does not depend
on information from the U.S. government. To the best of our knowledge, there is no such measure for the time
horizon and geographic scope needed by this study.
33should be interpreted as stylized facts consistent with consumer preferences not being a key
driving force of our main results.
For interest, we also collected data on the number of news stories about human rights
abuses published in two United Kingdom newspapers, The Guardian and The Observer.
(They are the only two non-U.S. English newspapers that are consistently available in the
ProQuest Historical Database). Column (8) shows that the interaction of alliance and Coun-
cil membership has no eﬀect on coverage in U.K. newspapers. This is consistent both with the
fact that U.K. newspapers have less to gain from currying the favor of the U.S. government as
well as the fact that U.K. readers could have very diﬀerent preferences from their American
counterparts.
We also investigate whether the main results diﬀer for the two presidential administra-
tions for the period of our study: Carter (1976-80) and Reagan (1980-88). Since the three
distorted newspapers are typically left-leaning, one may suspect that they are more likely to
go along with the distortions of the relatively left-leaning Carter administration. Similarly,
one would suspect that the eﬀects were smaller during that administration because Cold War
tensions were lower than during the Reagan Administration. The estimate in Table 5 Col-
umn (9) supports this. It shows that the eﬀect of distortions were smaller during the Carter
administration.
5.5 Mechanisms
The historical discussion of Public Diplomacy in Section 2.3 showed that the government
could inﬂuence news coverage through direct manipulation of the incentives of journalists
or through indirect manipulation of the supply of information to journalists. The latter is
especially relevant for news on remote and often physically dangerous locations for which it
is costly for the newspaper to obtain independent information. In this section, we investigate
the extent that the main eﬀects are a result of the government’s manipulation of information
(i.e. that information asymmetries between newspapers and the USSD contribute to the main
results) with an indirect test. We examine whether the eﬀect of government distortion is larger
when the cost for obtaining independent information is higher for the news organization. We
have three measures to proxy cost. First is the distance from the capital city to the nearest
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and report on a story. We were only able to obtain Cold War era bureau oﬃce locations for the
NYT. Table 5 Column (10) reports the estimated interaction eﬀect on NYT stories of human
rights abuses. There is no eﬀect. The estimate is near zero in magnitude and statistically
insigniﬁcant. Second is a dummy for whether there is no domestic media freedom according to
Freedom House in the foreign country. This reﬂects U.S. newspapers’ ability to pick up stories
from independent sources from within the country that’s being reported on. Column (11)
shows no evidence for the hypothesis that strategic objectives reduce coverage more when
there is no media freedom. The estimate is positive in sign and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Finally, we measure the newspaper’s ability to pick up a story by the number of newswire
stories, which are free of cost on the margin conditional on subscription. Column (12) shows
no evidence that distortions are larger when there are fewer newswire stories. The estimate
of the triple interaction has the opposite sign of what is expected, is small in magnitude and
statistically insigniﬁcant. These results together provide evidence to suggest that information
asymmetries are not likely to play an important role. They are consistent with the hypothesis
that the main results most likely reﬂect direct manipulation by the government.
5.6 Quantifying the Average Eﬀect
We quantify the eﬀects in two ways. First, we make the extreme assumption that the only
way for the government to inﬂuence the media was through the Country Reports and estimate
a 2SLS estimate of the eﬀects of under-reporting human rights violations in these reports on
news coverage of human rights. Since this exclusion restriction is unlikely to be satisﬁed in
practice, the 2SLS estimates should be interpreted only as an illustration of the upper-bound
eﬀects of biased Country Reports on news coverage.
The second stage equation can be characterized as the following.
LnHRNewsit = (USSDit   Amnestyit) + Xit + i + t + "it (3)
The natural logarithm of the number of news stories on human rights abuse for country i in
year t is a function of: the diﬀerence in the U.S. and Amnesty PTS scores, U:S:it Amnestyit;
a vector of time and country varying controls, which for the main speciﬁcations is just the
35Amnesty PTS score, Xit; country ﬁxed eﬀects, i; and year ﬁxed eﬀects, t. All standard
errors are clustered at the country level. Higher PTS reﬂects worse human rights conditions.
If government bias reduces news coverage, then ^  > 0.
We only report results for the Cold War period. Table 6 shows the OLS and 2SLS estimates
for the sum of human rights coverage across all six U.S. newspapers in our sample, and the
individual eﬀects for the NYT, Washington Post and the WSJ. Columns (1)-(3) show the
estimated correlations for all newspapers on average, the NYT and the Washington Post. The
estimates show that USSD under-reporting a country by one index point worse is associated
with a reduction in coverage as high as 0.32 log points. The estimates in Columns (1)-(3) are
signiﬁcant at the 1 % level. The OLS estimate for WSJ in Column (4) is small and statistically
insigniﬁcant. Columns (5)-(8) show the corresponding 2SLS estimates. They are an order of
a magnitude larger than the OLS estimates and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level for all
papers. The fact that these estimates are larger than the OLS estimates is consistent with
the belief that the government has other ways to inﬂuence the media beyond the reports and
the likely possibility that the diﬀerence in PTS scores measures government bias with error.
That said, under the assumptions stated above, these estimates say that if the USSD reported
a country as being one index point worse than Amnesty, then news coverage of abuses will
increase by approximately 2.4 to 3.3 log points. In practice, the USSD under-reported by 0.34
index points on average during the Cold War. Thus, the results say that during the Cold War,
USSD under-reporting decreased coverage by as much as 0.9 to 1.12 log points on average.
Second, we calculate the average value of a seat on the UNSC during the Cold War
conditional on a given level of alliance with the U.S. For this exercise, we choose four of
the U.S.’s strongest allies during the Cold War: Brazil, Zaire, Honduras and Chile. Table
7 Column (2) shows that these countries voted with the U.S. on 12%, 20%, 20% and 27%
of divided votes in the UNGA during the Cold War. Column (3) lists the average annual
number of news articles on human rights abuses for these countries during the Cold War. In
Column (4), we calculate the average eﬀect of being on the UNSC on the diﬀerence in USSD
and Amnesty PTS scores. This is the product of the measure of alliance in Column (2) and
the estimated coeﬃcient for the interaction term of UNSC membership and U.S. alliance plus
the coeﬃcient for the dummy variable of being on the UNSC. To be conservative, we use the
coeﬃcients from Table 4 Panel A Column (3) where country speciﬁc time trends are controlled
36for. These calculations show that during the Cold War, UNSC membership reduced USSD
reports of human rights abuses relative to Amnesty by 0.1 index points for Brazil, 0.35 index
points of Zaire, 0.36 index points for Honduras and 0.56 index points for Chile. In Column (5)
of Table 7, we similarly calculate the eﬀect on news coverage of abuses in U.S. newspapers. We
use the estimated coeﬃcients from Table 4 Panel B Column (3). The calculation shows that a
seat on the UNSC decreased news coverage of human rights abuse for Brazil by approximately
21%, for Zaire by approximately 57%, for Honduras by approximately 58% and for Chile by
approximately 74%.61
6 Interpretation
The main results of this study show that an increase in strategic value to the U.S. improves
reports of human rights practices from government agencies as measured by the State Depart-
ment’s Country Reports and reduces the amount of coverage of abuse in independently owned
national newspapers. The empirical strategy attempts to overcome the diﬃculty of omitted
variable bias, in particular, the possibility that the eﬀects on news coverage are driven by
consumer attitudes rather than strategic objectives. The stylized fact that the extent of gov-
ernment inﬂuence across papers is not correlated with readership preferences is additional
evidence suggesting that our main results are not driven by consumer preferences. Further-
more, the historical documents of the known cases of government manipulation of the news in
Section 2.3 together with the empirical ﬁnding that the extent of distortion does not vary with
newspapers’ costs for obtaining independent information provide suggestive qualitative and
quantitative evidence that direct manipulation of the incentives of journalists and editorial
61In addition, we benchmark our results against a human rights incident for which there was plausibly no
scope for government manipulation. We use the Chinese government crackdown on protesting students and
workers during the Tiananmen Square Incident on June 4, 1989. This event and the month long protest
leading up to it were widely covered in mass media at the time. As the death of Premier Hu Yaobang, which
instigated the protests, coincided with the seminal state visit from Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and
the international press corps that accompanied his visit, it is reasonable to assume that the U.S. government
could not distort coverage. This allows us to use the actual number of articles on human rights abuse in China
in the month following the incident as a benchmark for an undistorted coverage of a known human rights
violations event. For this example, we use only the NYT. In the 30 days after June 4th, the NYT wrote eleven
stories, ten more than the monthly average from the preceding year. Had the Tiananmen Square incident
been completely ignored by the NYT it would have written 91% fewer articles. Our most conservative reduced
from estimates from Table 4 suggest that for the median country, U.S. strategic objectives reduced coverage
by approximately 42% during the Cold War.
37boards is an important force behind the main results.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the extent of distortion across papers vary with their quality,
as measured by average daily circulation ranking and the ranking of the number of Pulitzer
Prizes for international news reporting. The residuals and regression lines from the bivariate
correlations between the estimated distortion for each newspaper from Table 6 Columns (2)-
(7) and the two quality rankings are plotted in Figures 7A and 7B. They show that the
extent of distortion is increasing with circulation, and increasing with the number of Pulitzer
Prizes. Taken literally, the stylized fact that the highest quality newspapers are the most
distorted is consistent with Besley and Prat’s (2006) model of media capture.62 It has the
interesting implication that there are probably high ﬁxed costs to entry to the media market for
international news reporting, and that this market is segmented. The intuition behind this is
simple in the Besley and Prat (2006) context where there exists a competitive market of proﬁt
maximizing ﬁrms and where consumers value and can verify accuracy. If there were zero entry
costs, then the marginal news outlet will enter the market to report the truth and earn positive
proﬁts when high reputation ﬁrms distort their reports. The ﬁrm that reports distorted news
will lose proﬁts. Therefore, in equilibrium, news outlets will not distort reports. It follows
that distortions will only occur in this context if there are high ﬁxed costs to entry. Examples
of ﬁxed costs include the formation of networks necessary for investigative journalism or
reputation. For example, readers may have a positive prior about the government’s credibility
and are therefore unlikely to believe a news story that goes against oﬃcial government reports
unless if it comes from a news outlet that has a long standing reputation for good journalism.
Such a reputation takes time to acquire. The potentially ambivalent eﬀects of reputation is
an interesting avenue for future studies.63
62In their model, media outlets, as competitive proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms, will agree to be distorted if the
proﬁts from going along with the distortions are higher than the proﬁts from reporting the truth. Thus,
the probability of capture will increase with the proﬁts from going along with the government (e.g. value of
exclusive access) and decrease with the costs (e.g. reputation loss). Furthermore, they show that if investments
towards the quality (e.g. the ability to reveal the truth) of news reporting is endogenous, then ﬁrms will
vertically diﬀerentiate in quality in equilibrium. In this case, the government will only attempt to capture the
ﬁrms whose qualities are high enough to reveal the truth. Under this framework, our results indicate that in
net, the beneﬁts of going along with the government dominate perceived costs of reputation losses. Moreover,
our ﬁndings are consistent with the prediction that the probability of capture is positively correlated with
quality.
63On the one hand, newspapers will want to invest in their quality by reporting the truth. On the other
hand, if there is a ﬁxed cost in obtaining quality, quality will segment the market between ﬁrms with and
without it, and consequently make it easier for the government to capture the relevant news outlets.
38For policy makers, potential segmentation of the market would imply that counting the
number of media ﬁrms in a market without taking segmentation into account could grossly
overstate the number of relevant ﬁrms. In our context, it means that the government perceived
that the majority of the readers it wished to inﬂuence obtained information from these three
newspapers and that information from other sources were not good substitutes. Hence, instead
of having to inﬂuence thousands of media outlets, it only had to inﬂuence a few.
There are several caveats to interpreting the results. First, our focus on human rights has
both advantages and limitations. On the one hand, it provides us with a well-deﬁned concept
that is relatively easy to measure in terms of government attitude and news coverage. On the
other hand, under-reporting human rights abuse is just one of the many favors that the U.S.
government can trade with foreign countries. Others could include increased U.S. foreign aid,
favorable trade tariﬀs, increased foreign direct investment, or allocating international events
that could raise the prestige of the governments of foreign countries (e.g. the Olympics).
These are interesting subjects for future research.
Second, it is beyond the scope of this paper to make conclusive statements about the welfare
implications of government distortions in our context. On the one hand, readers may not have
high value for accurate foreign news reports.64 Alternatively, if the readers gain utility from
knowing the government attitude or like hearing reports that are consistent with the oﬃcial
government agenda during a time of international political tensions and increased American
patriotism, then these results would not lead to a decrease in welfare. On the other hand,
there are many reasons to believe that government distortions reduce welfare. For example,
readers’ valuation of news may increase with the quality of news. The possibility that readers
simply like hearing reports of government attitudes seems low as we ﬁnd that the extent of
distortion is uncorrelated with reader preferences across newspapers. Moreover, there may be
negative externalities from distorted news reports; or, readers may not be time consistent and
therefore undervalue their future utility from accurate news reports. The welfare implication
64Similarly, American readers may not value international news. This is diﬃcult to assess. On the one
hand, advertising revenues suggest that reporting foreign news does not directly generate much proﬁt for
newspapers. For the NYT in 2008, they were less than 10% of revenues from domestic news. If these reﬂect
readers’ valuation for accuracy in international news, then the welfare reduction from these distortions likely to
be small. On the other hand, advertising revenues may not accurately capture the readers’ utility. For example,
respondents to readership surveys by The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times and The Baltimore Sun
ranked the international/national news section among the top sections they read (Caroll, 2007).
39of news distortions is an important topic for future studies.
7 Conclusion
This study estimates the eﬀect of strategic objectives of the U.S. government on news cov-
erage in U.S. newspapers. Our results show that even in a developed country with a large,
independently owned and competitive media industry, the scope for government manipula-
tion of the news can be signiﬁcant. The U.S. provides a context where nearly all domestic
news outlets are independently owned and where the market for news is by all accounts very
competitive. Therefore, the results we obtain on government manipulation in the U.S. can
broadly be interpreted as a lower-bound for the scope for manipulation in other countries.
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48Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
                                   
  A. All Years 1976-2005    B. Cold War 1976-88    C. Post Cold War 1991-2005 
Variable         Obs  Obs  Mean  Std. Errors     Obs  Mean  Std. Err.     Obs  Mean  Std. Err. 
                       
USSD PTS  2624  2.891  (0.021)    1010  2.680  (0.031)    1325  3.046  (0.030) 
Amnesty PTS  2624  3.029  (0.020)    1010  3.029  (0.030)    1325  3.034  (0.029) 
USSD -Amnesty PTS  2624  -0.138  (0.014)    1010  -0.349  (0.024)    1325  0.012  (0.019) 
U.S. Allaince  2624  0.091  (0.001)    1010  0.090  (0.002)    1325  0.093  (0.002) 
UNSC  2624  0.063  (0.005)    1010  0.066  (0.008)    1325  0.057  (0.006) 
                       
HR News  2624  11.284  (0.517)    1010  8.659  (0.674)    1325  13.440  (0.843) 
HR W Post  2624  3.501  (0.182)    1010  2.104  (0.172)    1325  4.842  (0.325) 
HR NYT  2624  2.798  (0.129)    1010  2.564  (0.190)    1325  2.884  (0.194) 
HR WSJ  2624  0.802  (0.053)    1010  0.250  (0.026)    1325  1.312  (0.100) 
HR C. Tribune (1976-1986)  820  0.776  (0.095)    820  0.776  (0.095)         
HR L.A. Times  2624  3.639  (0.173)    1010  2.328  (0.194)    1325  4.402  (0.284) 
HR CMS (1976-1996)  1773  0.447  (0.168)    1000  0.792  (0.07)         
HR U.K.   (1976-2003)  2441  0.629  (0.037)    1010  0.441  (0.04)    1142  0.7994746  (0.07) 
HR Newires  2544  11.109  (0.555)    1010  5.974  (0.616)    1325  14.768  (0.916) 
                       
Distance to NYT   2624  1463.779  (21.895)    1010  1443.204  (33.680)    1325  1479.349  (32.164) 
No Media Freedom  2624  0.393  (0.010)     1010  0.404  (0.015)     1325  0.383  (0.013) 
                       Table 2: The Effect of U.S. Alliance and UNSC Membership  on U.S. Stated Department’s Under-
reporting of Human Rights Abuses 
The coefficient of the interaction term U.S. Alliance x UNSC controlling for UNSC dummy variable, U.S. Alliance,  country and year 
fixed effects. 
                                   
  Dependent Variables: 
  USSD PTS    Amnesty PTS    USSD-Amnesty PTS  
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  All  All    All  All    All  All 
All 
Baseline  EverSC 
EverSC, 
Omit Zaire 
   A. Cold War 1976-88 
                       
U.S. Alliance 
x UNSC  -2.849  -3.022    2.622  1.212    -5.472  -4.234  -3.560  -3.397  -3.753 
  (4.249)  (1.649)    (3.303)  (2.867)    (2.585)  (2.278)  (1.346)  (1.480)  (2.690) 
                       
UNSC  0.0936  0.252    -0.306  -0.119    0.399  0.372  0.306  0.294  0.315 
  (0.312)  (0.148)    (0.262)  (0.237)    (0.207)  (0.186)  (0.118)  (0.129)  (0.180) 
                       
Amnesty                  -0.556  -0.638  -0.630 
                  (0.0491)  (0.0604)  (0.0599) 
                       
U.S. Alliance  -1.864      0.500      -2.363         
  (1.177)      (1.214)      (0.502)         
                       
Country FE  N  Y    N  Y    N  Y  Y  Y  Y 
                       
Observations  1010  1010    1010  1010    1010  1010  1010  607  595 
R-squared  0.050  0.664    0.007  0.622    0.143  0.363  0.552  0.551  0.547 
                       
  B. Post Cold War 1992-2005 
                       
U.S. Alliance 
x UNSC  -1.478  1.246    -1.427  0.401    -0.0517  0.845  1.099  1.162  1.187 
  (2.768)  (1.086)    (2.662)  (1.140)    (0.993)  (1.168)  (0.971)  (1.019)  (1.018) 
                       
UNSC  0.0852  -0.173    0.141  -0.0868    -0.0556  -0.0861  -0.141  -0.151  -0.153 
  (0.287)  (0.122)    (0.277)  (0.144)    (0.146)  (0.166)  (0.121)  (0.122)  (0.122) 
                       
Amnesty                  -0.634  -0.650  -0.648 
                  (0.0343)  (0.0478)  (0.0483) 
                       
U.S. Alliance  -0.475      -0.831      0.355         
  (1.377)      (1.298)      (0.345)         
                       
Country FE  N  Y    N  Y    N  Y  Y  Y  Y 
                       
Observations  1325  1325    1325  1325    1325  1325  1325  737  723 
R-squared  0.009  0.753     0.012  0.668     0.028  0.181  0.501  0.505  0.506 
All regressions control for year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
 Table 3: The Effect of U.S. Alliance and UNSC Membership on News Coverage 
of Human Rights Abuse 
The coefficient of the interaction term U.S. Alliance x UNSC controlling for UNSC dummy variable, 
U.S. Alliance, country and year fixed effects. 
                    
  Dependent Variable: Ln HR News 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  All  All  All 
All 
Baseline  Ever SC 
Ever SC, Omit 
Zaire 
   A. Cold War 1976-1988 
             
U.S. Alliance x UNSC  -7.871  -8.988  -11.07  -9.340  -9.387  -14.29 
  (8.802)  (4.873)  (7.276)  (4.328)  (3.986)  (5.369) 
             
UNSC  0.916  0.755  1.289  0.789  0.812  1.105 
  (0.722)  (0.351)  (0.624)  (0.315)  (0.294)  (0.338) 
             
Amnesty      1.222  0.290  0.268  0.250 
      (0.0853)  (0.0790)  (0.0880)  (0.0868) 
             
U.S. Alliance  4.591    3.980       
  (2.693)    (1.586)       
             
Country FE  N  Y  N  Y  Y  Y 
             
Observations  1010  1010  1010  1010  607  595 
R-squared  0.032  0.734  0.309  0.740  0.771  0.772 
             
  B. Post Cold War 1992-2005 
                   
U.S. Alliance x UNSC  5.081  -0.197  6.330  -0.265  -0.594  -0.510 
  (3.376)  (2.109)  (3.236)  (2.035)  (1.980)  (1.980) 
             
UNSC  0.186  0.177  0.0629  0.192  0.231  0.222 
  (0.422)  (0.213)  (0.384)  (0.207)  (0.210)  (0.211) 
             
Amnesty      0.875  0.170  0.204  0.198 
      (0.101)  (0.0617)  (0.0852)  (0.0864) 
             
U.S. Alliance  -0.629    0.0980       
  (2.694)    (2.162)       
             
Country FE  N  Y  N  Y  Y  Y 
             
Observations  1325  1325  1325  1325  737  723 
R-squared  0.027  0.767  0.222  0.769  0.758  0.758 
All regressions control for year fixed effects.         
Standard errors are clustered at the country level.       
 Table 4: The Effect of U.S. Alliance and UNSC Membership on U.S. State Department 
Underreporting and News Coverage of Human Rights Abuses - Robustness 
The coefficient of the interaction term U.S. Alliance x UNSC controlling for UNSC dummy variable, U.S. Alliance, 
 country and year fixed effects, and country specific time trends. 
                             
  Dependent Variables 
  Cold War 1976-1988    Restricted (Reagan) Cold War 1980-88 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  All  All  EverSC 
EverSC, 
Omit Zaire     All  All  EverSC 
EverSC, 
Omit Zaire 
  A. U.S. - Amnesty PTS 
                   
U.S. Alliance x UNSC  -3.560  -3.345  -3.120  -3.785    -3.515  -3.620  -3.120  -4.043 
  (1.346)  (1.554)  (1.673)  (3.069)    (1.487)  (1.625)  (1.673)  (3.541) 
                   
UNSC  0.306  0.279  0.267  0.307    0.285  0.314  0.267  0.360 
  (0.118)  (0.148)  (0.160)  (0.220)    (0.130)  (0.158)  (0.160)  (0.242) 
                   
Amnesty  -0.556  -0.665  -0.745  -0.742    -0.611  -0.757  -0.745  -0.846 
  (0.0491)  (0.0451)  (0.0521)  (0.0521)    (0.0581)  (0.0628)  (0.0521)  (0.0820) 
                   
Country Time Trends  N  Y  Y  Y    N  Y  Y  Y 
                   
Observations  1010  1010  607  595    776  776  607  456 
R-squared  0.552  0.646  0.635  0.631    0.585  0.690  0.635  0.672 
                   
                   
   B. Ln HR News 
U.S. Alliance x UNSC  -9.340  -7.354  -7.701  -11.45    -8.983  -9.556  -9.905  -18.55 
  (4.328)  (4.038)  (3.676)  (6.322)    (5.222)  (5.998)  (5.497)  (6.852) 
                   
UNSC  0.789  0.689  0.726  0.949    0.694  0.671  0.701  1.196 
  (0.315)  (0.332)  (0.307)  (0.431)    (0.366)  (0.423)  (0.382)  (0.443) 
                   
Amnesty  0.290  0.191  0.245  0.235    0.231  0.147  0.227  0.214 
  (0.0790)  (0.0924)  (0.107)  (0.106)    (0.0858)  (0.117)  (0.155)  (0.151) 
                   
Country Time Trends  N  Y  Y  Y    N  Y  Y  Y 
                   
Observations  1010  1010  607  595    776  776  465  456 
R-squared  0.740  0.786  0.807  0.807     0.783  0.830  0.853  0.856 
All regressions control for country and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Table 5: The Effect of U.S. Alliance and UNSC Membership on News Coverage of Human Rights Abuses – Heterogeneous Effects 
The coefficient of the interaction term U.S. Alliance x UNSC controlling for UNSC dummy variable, U.S. Alliance, country and year fixed effects; the coefficient of the triple interaction terms U.S. 
Alliance x UNSC x Cost of Obtaining Independent Information, controlling for the interaction term U.S. Alliance x UNSC, for UNSC dummy variable, U.S. Alliance, country and year fixed effects. 
                                      
  Dependent Variables: Ln HR Stories 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
   LnHRNews  LnHRWPost  LnHRNYT  LnHRWSJ  LnHRCHI  LnHRLATimes  LnHRCSM 
LnHR 
U.K.  LnHRNews  LnHRNYT  LnHRNews  LnHRNews 
                         
U.S. Alliance x UNSC  -9.387  -11.25  -9.683  -8.205  -5.061  -2.802  -5.664  -0.122  -9.908  -15.16  -11.34  -6.404 
  (3.986)  (3.369)  (2.966)  (3.949)  (3.480)  (5.250)  (3.976)  (4.977)  (6.117)  (6.556)  (7.617)  (3.391) 
                         
U.S. Ally x UNSC x Dist                    0.00328     
                    (0.00300)     
                         
U.S. Ally x UNSC x No 
Media Freedom                      2.903   
                      (8.988)   
                         
U.S. Ally x UNSC x 
Newswires                        -0.257 
                        (0.0937) 
                         
U.S. Ally x UNSC x 
Carter                  33.78       
                  (14.34)       
                         
Obs  607  607  607  607  496  607  597  607  607  595  607  588 
R-Sq  0.771  0.646  0.659  0.439  0.557  0.633  0.516  0.434  0.746  0.654  0.743  0.736 
All regressions control for UNSC dummy, Amnesty PTS, and country and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
Sample is restricted to countries that were on the UNSC at least once. Table 6: The OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of U.S. State Department Under-reporting  
on News Coverage 
Coefficient of U.S.-Amnesty PTS controlling for UNSC dummy variable, Amnesty PTS, country and year fixed effects 
 
                             
  Dependent Variables: Ln HR News Articles 
  A. OLS    B. 2SLS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
   LnHRNews  LnHRNYT  LnHRWPost  LnHRWSJ    LnHRNews  LnHRNYT  LnHRWPost  LnHRWSJ 
                            
USSD-
Amnesty PTS  0.226  0.239  0.324  0.0892    2.623  2.851  3.311  2.415 
  (0.105)  (0.107)  (0.129)  (0.104)    (1.626)  (1.367)  (1.905)  (1.378) 
                   
Observations  607  607  607  607    1010  607  607  607 
                   
Average 
Effect*  -0.0792  -0.0836  -0.114  -0.0312    -0.918  -0.998  -1.159  -0.845 
p-value  0.0361  0.0289  0.0148  0.393     0.110  0.0414  0.0874  0.0850 
All regressions control for UNSC dummy, Amnesty PTS, and country and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
* Average effect= coefficient for USSD-Amnesty PTS x -0.35. Table 7: Average Effect of Government Objectives for Select U.S. Cold War Allies 
              




Number of Annual HR 
Stories during CW 
Effect of Being on UNSC on U.S. 
PTS Underreporting  
% Effect of Being on UNSC on U.S. HR 
News Coverage 
         
         Alliance x-3.120+0.267  (exp[Alliance x -7.701+0.689]-1) x 100 
           
Brazil  0.12  11.58  -0.107  -20.80% 
         
Zaire  0.20  4.42  -0.349  -56.45% 
         
Honduras  0.20  11.36  -0.363  -57.90% 
         
Chile  0.27  44.75  -0.560  -74.14% 
         
 Figure 1: The Fraction of Divided Votes and Fraction of Countries Voting in Agreement with the 



































Figure 2B: Map of USSD Under-reporting 
 Figure 2C: Map of NYT Foreign Office Bureau Locations and Freedom House Media Freedom 
 
























































    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    










     
         
          
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    













     
         
          
     
   
     
     
     
     
  
    
    




















     
         
          Figure 4A: Plot of Residuals from Regression of U.S.-
Amnesty PTS on U.S. Alliance x UNSC – Countries that were 
Ever on the Security Council 
 
 
Figure 4B: Plot of Residuals from Regression of U.S.-
Amnesty PTS on U.S. Alliance x UNSC – Countries that were 









Figure 4C: Plot of Residuals from Regression of Ln HR News 
Articles on U.S. Alliance x UNSC – Countries that were Ever 
on the Security Council 
 
 
Figure 4D: Plot of Residuals from Regression of Ln HR News 
Articles on U.S. Alliance x UNSC – Countries that were Ever 
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e( scmem_USally | X )
coef = -14.677971, (robust) se = 5.390646, t = -2.72Figure 5: The Effect of U.S. Alliance x UNSC on USSD Under-Reporting by Year on the Council 
The coefficients of the interaction terms of U.S. Alliance and dummy variables for the number of years before, during and 






























































Post Cold War Figure 6A: Residual Plot of the Bivariate Correlation between 
the Estimated Effect of U.S. Alliance x UNSC on News 
Coverage and Mondo Conservativeness Rating 
 
 
Figure 6B: Residual Plot of the Bivariate Correlation between 
the Estimated Effect of U.S. Alliance x UNSC on News 







Figure 7A: Residual Plot of the Bivariate Correlation between the 




Figure 7B: Residual Plot of the Bivariate Correlation between the 
Estimated Effect of U.S. Alliance x UNSC on News Coverage and 
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Estimated Distortion
coef = .58926546, se = .28954535, t = 2.04 
 
APPENDIX Table A1: The Correlation between U.S. Alliance x UNSC and Foreign Aid 
                 
  Dependent Variables: Ln Foreign Aid Reciepts (USD 1996) 
  Cold War 1976-1989     Post Cold War 1989-2005 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
  Ln U.S. Aid  Ln ODA    Ln U.S. Aid  Ln ODA 
                
U.S. Alliance x UNSC  4.229  1.953    -3.046  -0.778 
  (9.027)  (5.052)    (3.969)  (2.812) 
           
UNSC  0.305  0.549    0.397  0.191 
  (0.603)  (0.373)    (0.563)  (0.342) 
           
U.S. Alliance  6.507  0.742    0.212  -3.889 
  (2.010)  (1.660)    (2.046)  (1.711) 
           
Observations  996  940    938  1226 
R-squared  0.090  0.023     0.009  0.048 
All regressions control for country and year fixed effects.  
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
 Table A2: UNSC Members 1976-88, 1992-2005 
                          
Cold War 1976-1988    Post Cold War 1992-2002 
year  Country  year  Country     year  Country  year  Country 
1977  Benin  1984  Peru    1992  Zimbabwe  1999  Malaysia 
1977  Venezuela, RB  1984  Nicaragua    1992  Ecuador  1999  Brazil 
1977  India  1985  Thailand    1992  Venezuela, RB  2000  Malaysia 
1977  Pakistan  1985  India    1992  India  2000  Bangladesh 
1978  Venezuela, RB  1985  Peru    1992  Hungary  2000  Mali 
1978  India  1985  Egypt, Arab Rep.    1993  Hungary  2000  Jamaica 
1978  Nigeria  1985  Trinidad and Tobago    1993  Brazil  2000  Tunisia 
1978  Bolivia  1985  Burkina Faso    1993  Venezuela, RB  2000  Argentina 
1979  Bangladesh  1985  Madagascar    1993  Pakistan  2001  Bangladesh 
1979  Gabon  1986  Congo, Rep.    1994  Djibouti  2001  Colombia 
1979  Bolivia  1986  Ghana    1994  Oman  2001  Tunisia 
1979  Zambia  1986  Madagascar    1994  Argentina  2001  Jamaica 
1979  Nigeria  1986  Venezuela, RB    1994  Brazil  2002  Bulgaria 
1980  Mexico  1986  Thailand    1994  Rwanda  2002  Guinea 
1980  Zambia  1986  Trinidad and Tobago    1994  Pakistan  2002  Colombia 
1980  Bangladesh  1986  Bulgaria    1994  Nigeria  2002  Cameroon 
1980  Philippines  1987  Zambia    1995  Indonesia  2002  Mexico 
1980  Tunisia  1987  Ghana    1995  Botswana  2002  Syrian Arab Republic 
1981  Niger  1987  Congo, Rep.    1995  Honduras  2003  Guinea 
1981  Tunisia  1987  Venezuela, RB    1995  Argentina  2003  Bulgaria 
1981  Philippines  1987  Argentina    1995  Oman  2003  Angola 
1981  Uganda  1987  Bulgaria    1995  Rwanda  2003  Cameroon 
1981  Mexico  1988  Argentina    1995  Nigeria  2003  Chile 
1982  Poland  1988  Nepal    1996  Indonesia  2003  Syrian Arab Republic 
1982  Togo  1988  Senegal    1996  Egypt, Arab Rep.  2003  Pakistan 
1982  Congo, Dem. Rep.  1988  Brazil    1996  Honduras  2003  Mexico 
1982  Uganda  1988  Zambia    1996  Chile  2004  Romania 
1983  Congo, Dem. Rep.  1988  Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep.    1996  Guinea-Bissau  2004  Angola 
1983  Nicaragua  1988  Algeria    1996  Botswana  2004  Brazil 
1983  Pakistan        1997  Kenya  2004  Pakistan 
1983  Togo        1997  Chile  2004  Philippines 
1983  Zimbabwe        1997  Egypt, Arab Rep.  2004  Algeria 
1983  Poland        1997  Costa Rica  2004  Chile 
1984  Burkina Faso        1998  Brazil  2005  Algeria 
1984  India        1998  Kenya  2005  Brazil 
1984  Egypt, Arab Rep.        1998  Gambia, The  2005  Romania 
1984  Zimbabwe        1999  Gambia, The  2005  Philippines 
1984  Pakistan           1999  Argentina       
                 
 Table A3: The Effect of U.S. Alliance x UNSC on USSD Under-reporting and News Coverage – 
Flexible Estimating Equation 
The coefficient of the interaction terms medium U.S. Alliance x UNSC and high U.S. Alliance x UNSC controlling for 
UNSC dummy variable, U.S. Alliance, country and year fixed effects. 
 
                 
  Dependent Variables 
  U.S. - Amnesty PTS     Ln HR News Stories 










                 
Medium U.S. Alliance x UNSC  -0.134  0.159    -0.544  -0.354 
  (0.150)  (0.174)    (0.311)  (0.263) 
           
Strongest U.S. Alliance x UNSC  -0.398  0.167    -1.086  -0.231 
  (0.163)  (0.175)    (0.511)  (0.272) 
           
UNSC  0.194  -0.159    0.612  0.380 
  (0.0937)  (0.148)    (0.246)  (0.194) 
           
Amnesty  -0.555  -0.634    0.290  0.171 
  (0.0495)  (0.0343)    (0.0788)  (0.0618) 
           
Observations  1010  1325    1010  1325 
R-squared  0.552  0.501     0.740  0.769 
All regression control of country and year fixed effects.  
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. 










 Table A4: The Effect of U.S. Alliance x UNSC on USSD Under-Reporting by Year on the Council 
The coefficients of the interaction terms of U.S. Alliance and dummy variables for the number of years before, during and 
after Council membership, controlling for U.S. Alliance, UNSC dummy variable, and year fixed effects 
           
Dependent Variable: U.S. -Amnesty PTS 
  (1)    (2) 
  Cold War    Post Cold War 
           
U.S. Alliance x UNSC - 2  0.0141    -1.656 
  (2.332)    (1.466) 
       
U.S. Alliance x UNSC -1  0.342    -0.978 
  (3.424)    (1.393) 
       
U.S. Alliance x UNSC 1  -6.590    1.284 
  (5.150)    (1.456) 
       
U.S. Alliance x UNSC 2  -8.383    -2.057 
  (4.453)    (1.699) 
       
U.S. Alliance x UNSC +1  1.222    -0.878 
  (4.009)    (1.248) 
       
U.S. Alliance x UNSC +2  -2.740    -1.631 
  (4.550)    (1.734) 
       
U.S. Alliance  -2.423    0.464 
  (0.536)    (0.358) 
       
Observations  998    1311 
R-squared  0.148    0.033 
       
Joint F for UNSC Years  16.57    22.43 
p-value  5.89e-07     7.33e-09 
Regressions control for country and year fixed effects.     
Standard errors are clustered at the country 











 Table A5: The Effect of U.S. Alliance x UNSC on News Coverage – Robustness to Censoring 
The coefficient of the interaction term U.S. Alliance x UNSC controlling for UNSC dummy variable, U.S. Alliance, 
 country and year fixed effects. 
           
  Dependent Variable: Ln HR News Articles 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
       
  OLS  OLS  Tobit 
       
Sample:  Full  HRNews>0  Full 
        
U.S. Alliance x UNSC  -9.340  -8.323  -7.752 
  (4.328)  (2.972)  (3.358) 
       
UNSC  0.789  0.652  0.683 
  (0.315)  (0.295)  (0.279) 
       
Observations  1010  504  1010 
All regressions control for UNSC dummy, Amnesty PTS, and country and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
 Figure A1: The Total Number of HR Articles in Six U.S. Newspapers before and after the Release 
of Country Reports 


























    
     
     
     
     
     































     
             
       
    
    
        
          
             
      
          